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In this study, I explore the different factors enabling civil society in influencing state 
practices. And how this is reflected in the social and economic development of the state. I 
am mainly focusing on Egypt, specifically going through a comparative analysis of the 
different development strategies from Nasser till Al Sisy. In addition, drawing a 
comparison between Innovation and Civic Education as two case studies. The framework 
through which the dynamic state society relations are explored is Michael Mann’s 
“Sources of Social Power” and Joel S. Migdal’s “Strong Societies and Weak States”. The 
different factors I identified were; political change, the purpose of the local civil society 
actors, as well as international support. The influence of these factors on state practices 
from recognition of civil society, support to civil society, and policy change. And thus, 
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During the past five years Egypt has been making it to the headlines in the different news 
agencies, either as a case where democracy is finally arriving or a case of a persistent 
authoritarian regime. The role of Civil Society has been highlighted in this phase either as 
the opposition agent bringing about democracy or the one failing in this process.  While 
these statements might hold some truth in them, they are in a way falling short in 
explaining what the Civil Society means and what role did the Civil Society have and 
how it shaped and was shaped by its dynamic relation between the society and the State.  
 
Civil society in general, and not only in Egypt, is a contested concept with 
different understanding, yet for the purpose of the study I will be looking at Civil Society 
as Sheila Carapico defined it as “an associational space situated between government and 
households, and also between the public state sector and the commercial economy.” She 
then adds that civil society does not aim at taking over the state but rather it is a 
metaphorical space for civil discourse and volunteerism, it is not driven by profit either 
(Carapico, 2013: 99). With this understanding of what civil society means, this imaginary 
public square of activism has always been a space where the state and the society are 
interacting. Looking closer at how the state and the society are interacting within the 
sphere of the civil society helps in understanding the different factors that enable the civil 
society to influence the state practices. Thus, it can contribute to the understanding of the 
development both the states and the societies are going through together. 
 
Egypt is a no different than the rest of the world, the civil society remains a space 
between the society and the state where dynamic interaction takes place. Different 
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stakeholders emerge and interact together within the civil society, shaping a dynamic 
interaction between the state and the society determining the social and economic 
development. Development is a wide concept and encompasses different fields be it 
political, economic, or social. For the purpose of the study the focus would be on two 
fields, one, mainly having economic value, and has been growing exponentially within 
Egypt; namely the field of innovation. Another has both political and social value, and 
has always been important on the agenda of development; civic education. By examining 
the dynamic interaction between the state and the society within the two fields of study, 
one would be aiming to understand: 
 
What are the factors that enable the Civil Society to influence the state practices 
in Egypt?  
 
My main argument is: Purpose of local civil society actors, Political change, and 
International support are the main factors enabling civil society to influence the state 
practices. This influence could be used as an indicator in studying the economic and 
social development in Egypt.  
 
Influence will be tackled within the sub-hypothesis, yet first I will outline some 
definitions I will be using throughout the course of the study: 
By Local civil society actors I mean formal and informal groups and 
organizations- that could also be viewed as registered under the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity (MoSS) or unregistered- that operate within the country. What distinguishes 
these actors from the international actors is the scope of their work; they are local in the 
sense that their scope does not cover other countries.  
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By State Practices I mean the everyday activities the state engages in with the 
society from policies, ministerial decrees, statements by state officials, activities, events, 
meetings…etc. 
The Influence that I will be trying to track is the change in recognition of the state 
to the local actors, the support that is offered by the state to the local actors it can be 
either financial or technical support; it might also take the form of partnership 
agreements, and finally the change in the policies of the state.  
The time frame of the study would be mainly tracing the change within the period 
that followed the issuance of the civil society law in 2002 and until the year 20151. 
 
The research question brings about some sub questions that further elaborate on 
the issue. 
● How does the purpose of local civil society actors influence state 
practices? 
● What are the implications of the uprising in 2011 on the processes of 
influencing the state practices by the local civil society actors? 
● How do International Actors impact the ability of the local civil society 
actors to influence state practices? 
In an attempt to answer the questions, three hypotheses have been drawn: 
1. The more economic the purpose of local civil society actors is, the more 
successful they are in influencing State Practices. 
2. The period that followed the uprising in 2011 witnessed more influence on 
the State Practices by the local civil society actors. 
                                                
1 As explained later in the Methodology, the different case studies selected have different starting and 
ending dates within the timeframe specified above. 
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3. The more consistent the agenda of the Local civil society actors with the 
international organizations operating within the country, the more successful they are in 
influencing state practices. 
 
Methodology 
This study has a comparative angle to it. Comparative analysis would be drawn between 
state society relations within the fields of innovation and civic education.  In the course of 
the study I will depend on content analysis of the different policies, in-depth interviews 
within the frame of the case studies, and questionnaires I also developed within the case 
studies to capture the understanding of the different stakeholders to the fields of 
development and the main concepts within the fields. I will also depend on participant 
observation, to document the reflections gathered from attending different events within 
the frame of the two case studies during 2015 and 2016. Lastly, I will draw on my 
personal experience within the field of development specifically within the field of civic 
education working in since 2011 in a Non Governmental Organization (NGO), as a 
project coordinator, a project manager, and finally as a director of programs. 
 
Below is a thorough explanation of the different components of the methodology; 
namely: case studies, questionnaires, in depth interviews, participant observation, and 
personal experience.  
 
Case Studies: Through the course of this research the focus would be on two main 
fields existing within the development agenda in Egypt where both the state and the 
society are interacting. The two fields, as mentioned before, are Innovation and Civic 
Education. The two case studies were selected for multiple reasons. First, within the two 
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fields both local and state actors are present and there is a high intensity of interaction 
between them. Second, there has been a significant increase in the number of 
organizations working in the two fields within the period following the uprising in 2011. 
Third, both fields hold different purposes, while the innovation field is assumed to make 
more significant change and more encouragement from the state, the civic education field 
is regarded as a contested field and the state is slow in responding to the growth that 
exists within this field. Fourth, the difference in the level of influence within the two 
fields. Within the field of the innovation, policy change can be traced to a certain extent 
where the state –across the past few years- showed signs of change in its recognition, 
support, and policies. While on the other hand the different attempts of change in the field 
of the civic education have not witnessed significant influence on state practices on the 
three levels whether recognition, support, or policies.  
 
Brief about the case studies: Innovation is defined with the Oslo Manual as “the 
implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, 
a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, 
workplace organization or external relations.” (OECD, 2005). Which translates into 
innovation finding its way as a defining factor to the level of development of the state. 
Innovation is also closely related to entrepreneurship, Research and Development, as well 
as the use of Information Technology. An example of how innovation as a field within 
the development world has emerged and gained momentum is the formation of the 
“Innovation Union: A Europe 2020 initiative" by the European Commission. Innovation 
Union is “the European Union strategy to create an innovation-friendly environment that 
makes it easier for great ideas to be turned into products and services that will bring our 
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economy growth and jobs” (EC, 2015). In addition to the Presence of an Innovation 
Strategy for the OECD2.  
 
In Egypt as a field it has been gaining more attention since the beginning of the 
2000s with the rise of NGOs working on innovation through social entrepreneurship. The 
state picked up this trend; an example would be the Ministry of Scientific research 
adopting an innovation strategy in 2006, also the establishment of “Technology 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship Centre” (TIEC) in 2010 the first governmental incubator 
of technology related startups. Within the Egyptian 2030 Sustainable Development 
strategy “Innovation” has been mentioned several times within the goals of the strategy.  
 
Choosing the case studies within the field depended mainly on several criteria that 
relate to the hypotheses, one of which is the presence of interaction between the state and 
the civil society actors. Another is the intention of the civil society to influence the state 
practices from recognition, support and policy.  
 
Depending on the above mentioned criteria two cases are selected. One about a 
program within a NGO aiming to influence the recognition and support of the state. 
Another is of a NGO aiming to influence the policy level.  
 
The first case is; Young Innovators Awards (YIA); a program under the umbrella 
of Nahdet Al Mahrousa (NM), an Egyptian NGO operating since 2004. YIA is one of the 
earliest attempts to offer technical and financial support to the young innovators from 
different public universities from natural sciences backgrounds.  (NM, 2008) 
                                                
2 For more information on the OECD innovation strategy visit the official website: 
http://www.oecd.org/site/innovationstrategy/defininginnovation.htm 
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The other example is ECASTI, a registered NGO under the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity (MoSS) in 2013. Mainly acting as a think tank for science, technology, and 
innovation policies, strategies, and laws.  
 
The second field to be addressed is Civic Education. Unlike innovation, civic 
education has political and social purposes. Though the innovation field might be 
considered gaining attention recently, civic education is not. It has been on the agenda of 
several local organizations, governmental institutions as well as international organization 
from a long time. On the local level the establishment of the Youth Association for 
Population and Development (YAPD) in 1995 would be an example, on the level of the 
government the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MoYS) established a unit inside the 
ministry for civic education in the early 2000s. Finally on the international organizations 
level different examples can be mentioned here from UN Habitat, United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), as well as the German aid organization known as GIZ. 
Within this case study, I would be looking at the Egyptian Youth Federation (EYF) as a 
local organization working on civic education since its establishment in 2006, mainly 
focusing on the influence EYF was trying to make on the recognition, support, and policy 
levels. What I will be attempting to do is looking at these interactions, analyzing them, 
and identifying the instances of influence in the state practices in recognition, support, or 
policies towards the organization itself as well as towards the field in general.  
 
Questionnaires: These questionnaires were targeting gaining a deeper insight to 
the understanding of the two concepts, development because of the difficulty attached to 
defining the concept, and innovation because of the recent attention this field has been 
gaining. The questionnaires mainly target the perception of the different stakeholders 
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working within development. Specifically, two questionnaires were developed. The 
questions of the two questionnaires are found in annex 1.  Each questionnaire had 21 
respondents.   
 
In-depth interviews: The fieldwork will be mainly done through in-depth 
interviews with the stakeholders involved in the two case studies presented. For each case 
study interviews will be conducted. The stakeholders Identified so far: State officials 
working in the field of the cases, Local Organization active from the early 2000s, Local 
organization active after the 2011, an informal group working in the same field, an 
international actor working in the field, and finally a company/social enterprise.  
 
Participant observation: During 2015 and 2016, there were several events relating 
to the innovation field as well as civic education; reflecting on these events and writing 
the insights these events gave me would be added to the study. I have attended as well as 
facilitated different national, regional, and international events within the two fields. An 
example would be the events I attended within the innovation field in 2016:  “Innovation 
Cluster Initiative (iCi) Workshop”, organized by TIEC/ Information Technology Industry 
Development Agency (ITIDA) on the 22nd of June 2016. “Rise um Berlin” organized by 
Rise up, a startup working on entrepreneurship, on 13th of July 2016. In Berlin, Germany. 
“Support for Coworking spaces and founding startups in Alexandria”, and event 
organized by the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT) on the 18th of 
July 2016, in the bibliotheca Alexandrina, Alexandria, Egypt. “Technovation 2016”, 
organized in the American University in Cairo, on 1st and 2nd of December 2016. Cairo, 
Egypt. “Social Startup Carnival “ organized different NGOs and funded by Research 
development and Innovation Program (RDI) on the 26th of November 2016.Cairo, Egypt.  
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Personal experience: I will also draw on my personal experience. My personal 
experience could be summarized in my 9 years work experience within youth 
development. Namely working with three different NGOs. The Most relevant one is my 7 
years work experience within EYF, leading the civic education component within the 
NGO as well as directing the programs of the NGO. I will highlight my experience in two 
aspects. The first, depending mainly on my network within the field of civil society to 
map the different organizations working in the field. In addition, this network would help 
me to reaching out to the relevant stakeholders for conducting the interviews. Second, my 
observations as a participant myself in a number of projects, programs, conferences, and 
events focusing on Civil Society State relations nationally, regionally, and internationally.  
 
The study would be organized in six chapters; chapter one just concluded the 
research question, the main argument, as well as the methodology this study would 
follow. Chapter two includes the literature review and theoretical framework this study 
would use. Chapter three would outline the development strategies and the evolution of 
state society relations from Nasser to the present date would be elaborated on. Chapters 
four and five would be examining in depth the two fields, innovation and civic education, 
and their case studies in Egypt respectively. Chapter six would be the concluding remarks 
on the overall study. 
Moving to chapter two where how the present and the past literature address the 
research question and paving the way to theoretical lens through which this study would 
be looking at the question.   
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
This chapter mainly explores how the research question was addressed by different 
scholars then identifying the theoretical framework of this study.  
 
Literature Review 
Here I will be dividing the literature review into two subtopics, namely: how 
development has been perceived whether social or economic, in addition to approaches to 
exploring the role of Civil Society as a transition agent or catalyst for social and 
economic development. Then I will outline the theoretical framework of the study.  
Development as a field of study: 
Development can be looked at as a concept, a process, and a discipline. It is 
complex in nature, and there has been an ongoing debate around it ever since the 
discipline started spreading in the aftermath World War II. Below I would mainly explore 
the evolution in defining the concept, and explore the challenges that are associated with 
it. 
After World War II, development started to gain attention as a result of multiple 
reasons. First, The realization that the worldwide spread of markets has not automatically 
brought the benefits promised by nineteenth –century economic theory. Second, The 
emergence of socialism as a viable development alternative. Third, Pressure for economic 
development exerted by the newly independent countries of Latin America, Asia and 
Africa. (Wilber & Jameson, 1981) 
 
Linguistically, the word development is defined, according to Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary, as “the act, process or result of developing: the state of 
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being developed: a gradual unfolding by which something is developed: gradual advance 
or growth through progressive changes.” (Webster, 2015).  Within this definition, 
movement from a state/place could be detected as an underlying characteristic of 
development. Not only movement, yet movement in a certain direction. This direction is 
what is called advancement or progress. The process of movement within a certain path 
has the time element attached to it. Which reflects that development must be dealt in a 
historical context. The historical experience will condition the stage in which a country 
finds itself and the degree to which its development has unfolded. 
  
As much as there is no one definition that can describe what development is as a 
process and field of study. It was attached to the concept of progress in the classical 
writers, Marx, as well as the neoclassical school of development thinking. During the 
evolution of the concept it was seen as equivalent to modernization. Yet, as much as the 
term was associated with modernization in the past it soon enough broke away from the 
term and established itself as a separate concept, because of the problematic nature of 
tying the term to the concept of modernization. This problematic nature is lying in 
predetermined path modernization draws for all the states. Which proved unlikely to 
happen, as the developing countries remained underdeveloped.  
 
Development was also equated with liberalization. Yet, liberalization is not an end 
in itself, it is a means to an end, it is a process that is related to the distribution of power 
within a national context, it changes the relations within the society, and reorganize it in a 
way that affects the power dynamics and the distribution of power within the national 
context. 
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If the concept is not equated with either modernization, below were some 
characteristics of development as put by Tschirgi. For him, “Development remains as an 
elusive subject, because there is still debate on what it is and what is the best practices for 
it. There is no ultimate development goal but some recommended development strategies. 
There are three main actors that affect and are affected by the development objectives, 
they are: social structures (for social mobility), national state (for political organization 
and participation) and economies (for production and distribution). Although scientists 
will always find methodological flaws and be ethnocentrically biased, history is 
progressive in nature  (Tschirgi, 1996) 
He then continues to talk about how development is multifaceted and 
interdependent. How it also involves choice and thus morals. In addition, he stresses on 
the importance within which development occurs, it does not occur in vacuum, both the 
national and the global contexts have great impact on it. This impact of the context could 
take different forms most importantly environmental or cultural. He stresses on the 
uneven nature of development that differs from one society to another, because for him, it 
is a social rather than an individual phenomena. (Ibid, 1996) 
 
Though modernization and liberalization are not synonyms to development, they 
have been used as indicators to the development process of different countries as well as 
basis on which different underdeveloped countries create their own sustainable 
development strategies. 
 
Looking at development not as merely economic has been growing within the 
recent literature, adding a social aspect to measuring the development of a country took 
place with the introduction of the Human Development Index. This Index, though it can 
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be problematic in some aspects, rests on bringing human at the heart of development. The 
Human Developed Index was developed based on the realization that human should be 
the real end of development, and that the development process should be centralized 
around humans. 
  
The main purpose of the Human Development Index (HDI) is conducting an 
assessment of the development of the country without solely focusing on economic 
growth; it puts people and their capabilities at the center and using it as the ultimate 
criteria. HDI is designed to reflect average achievements in three basic aspects of human 
development – leading a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and enjoying a 
decent standard of living, and having a decent standard of living. Where life expectancy 
reflects health, knowledge reflects education, and decent standard of living is reflected by 
the GNI (PPP$). 
 
Development as a concept and as a discipline has been facing a number of 
challenges that sometimes questioned the value in its existence. There are many 
challenges facing development. First, the idea of exploitation, or in other terms the idea 
that for something to develop something else needs to un-develop. The dependency 
theorists in their different explanations of why the underdeveloped world is not 
flourishing as expected explained this more thoroughly. They started to shed light on the 
exploitative nature of the relation between the developed world and the underdeveloped 
world. They were highlighting that the developed countries are developed because they 
depended in their development on the underdeveloped world; in other terms as Andre 
Gunder Frank puts it, the developed world were never underdeveloped they were 
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undeveloped, and that the past of the developed does not resemble the present of the 
underdeveloped by any means. 
  
Second, the hierarchical nature of development. Where there is always an 
underlying assumption that the people/ organizations would help other 
communities/countries develop assuming they know the right formula and the right 
processes, and assuming that knowledge exists outside the underdeveloped and is present 
within the developed. This underlying assumption have to be contested, since the past 
decades have witnessed some major development projects such as the structural 
adjustment programs proved to do wrong more than right, to harm more than to help, and 
final to contribute to the underdevelopment more than the development. 
  
A third challenge is the relative weight of Non-state actors. A large number of 
non-state actors are involved from international organizations, national organizations, 
local organizations, local communities, and the individuals themselves. The multiple 
players involved in the process might have conflicting goals that might make the process 
complicated. 
  
Finally, the discipline itself was a concept invented in the developed world, and 
exported to the underdeveloped world, defining development in their terms and putting 
meaning in it with little attention to what it actually means to the underdeveloped world. 
Accordingly, new concepts are evolving from globalization and integration into the world 
system, which are gradually replacing development. 
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Before moving on to understanding the different approaches to defining the role of 
civil society, it is fair to conclude this part stressing on the complex nature of 
development. Movement and progress lies at the heart of development. Though there is 
no one definition of development it should be looked at in a more comprehensive way, 
because it is multifaceted and interdependent. There is a difference in the perception of 
the different players of development to the goal of development yet there is an agreement 
that it works with change and progress. Lastly, as the concept developed humans were 
becoming more and more at the heart of the process. Understanding the dynamic nature 
of interaction between the different stakeholders within the field within the historical 
context would be an indicator to the type of social and economic development the state is 
reaching.  
 
Approaches to exploring the role of the civil society: 
The role of the civil society in the Arab world has been gaining some attention 
especially in the aftermath of the uprisings in 2011. The role of the Civil Society and its 
influence was approached differently. One approach was mainly looking at the Civil 
Society from a transition perspective, another from a developmental perspective. Outlined 
below are the two approaches and their arguments.   
 
The first approach attempts to track the role of the civil society as a tool of 
“democratization” or “authoritarian resilience”. Which means that in some cases the Civil 
Society is looked at as a replacement to the opposition parties, like what Langohr argues 
in the article “Too much Civil Society, Too Little Politics”. The argument is basically 
revolving around looking at NGOs, specifically the ones working with advocacy, as 
agents that are replacing the opposition parties, and thus performing the role of the 
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opposition within the regime. Following this definition of the Civil Society and its role, 
the final conclusion would be that there is only so little it can do and it cannot be the 
agent of “Transition” towards democracy. As Langohr puts it “Groups seeking to 
challenge authoritarian rule require widespread popular support, and nongovernmental 
organizations, which are typically single issue groups with small local constituencies 
dependent entirely on foreign largesse, are ill equipped to lead the charge”. (Langohr, 
2004: 200) 
 
Narrowing down the role of the Civil Society as only opposition in the Arab 
World raised the questions of why is it failing to bring about this “transition”. This is 
evident in several writings, an example would be what Niklas Plaetzer tackled in his 
article “Civil Society as Domestication: Egyptian and Tunisian Uprisings Beyond Liberal 
Transitology”, where he highlights why civil society as an analytical lens failed to explain 
transition and failed in its role to bring about transition. In his article he argues that civil 
society holds as a weak framework in explaining why transition did not happen within the 
Arab Spring countries. (Plaetzer, 2014: 262) 
 
When trying to answer the question of why civil society is failing to make the 
transition to democracy, Francesco Cavatorta and Azzam Alananza in their article, “Show 
me the money! Opposition, western funding, and civil society in Jordan and Lebanon” 
start with summarizing the debate present in the literature. The three explanations they 
found in the literature is: First, they talk about the “uncivil” nature of the Civil Society in 
the Arab world. Second, they explain the weakness and fragmentation of the Civil 
Society. Lastly, they mention the different strategies that the regimes employ to control 
the civil society within the Arab world from “co-option” to “repression”. After the 
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summary they write their argument that the Civil Society in the Arab world is not weak, it 
is strong because of its ability to survive the different types of control mechanisms by the 
regimes. They add that the problem with civil society in the Arab world is that it is 
divided into two camps the liberal camp and the Islamists, and this division is the core of 
the problem. They also argue that the foreign funding is playing an active role in 
reinforcing this division. They summarize the problem in a sentence stating that what the 
Arab countries have is a “strong Civil Society that is unable to unite”. (Cavatora & 
Alananza, 2010: 89) 
 
The challenge with this approach is that when it decides to look at the civil 
society, it looks at it as a coherent actor, without recognizing the diversity present within 
the civil society. In addition, this approach assumes a role for the civil society framing it 
as an opposition to the current regime/s and does not verify this role set forward by the 
different actors within civil society. Furthermore, it looks at civil society as a passive 
player where it gets influenced by the state strategies as well as foreign funding with little 
attention given to how it perceives itself and its role. The diversity present within it, as 
well as the different strategies that the civil society actors employ to influence social 
change are simply overlooked.  
 
Another approach to looking at the civil society starts at what Eva Bellin mentions 
in some of her writings. She brings about an interesting aspect, concerning the role of the 
Civil Society in bringing about “transformation” on the polity level rather than regime 
change or transition. (Bellin, 1994: 509). 
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This opinion is relevant because it considers the other side of the debate regarding 
how to look at Civil Society. Here Maha Abdelrahman wrote an article outlining the 
conflictual and reactionary nature of the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). What she 
offers is a different account of the Egyptian case, where she explores “ how the state is no 
longer the prime authoritarian force in repressing civil society organization. Instead, civil 
society has become an arena for political conflict and its organizations have been seized 
by representatives of contending political programs that often resort to violence and 
repression to suppress other groups within civil society.” (Abdelrahman, 2002: 21). She 
also defines civil society more broadly; as “more than the sum of its organizations: it is 
the environment in which these organizations develop and interact. Civil society 
organizations are the product as well as the components of the society as a whole and 
their formation an ongoing process that is born out of continuing changes in domestic 
social forces, the state, and the complex in which the two interact. “ (Ibid: 34). What she 
offers in her article is a recommendation on “how a more critical version of civil society 
could be used as a conceptual framework for analyzing social and political 
transformation” (Ibid: 34) 
 
This understanding Maha Abdelrahman offers is approaching civil society within 
a bigger context, the state society relations and how they influence the sphere of the civil 
society as well. Looking at civil society from this perspective would be looking at it as a 
space existing between the state and the society, and that the state is not the only powerful 
actor in opposition to civil society, on the contrary it is within the civil society that exists 
the interaction between the state and other actors. This approach is not new, it has it roots 
within the literature of different scholars studying state society relations and specifically 
focusing on social control. An important attempt was made by Migdal in his book 
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“Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World”. In this book he tries to breakaway from the assumption that the core is the 
one having more influence on the periphery and that whatever happens in the periphery 
does not affect the core. He explores different examples where the periphery shaped the 
core and as he went on in the book he was trying to look at the state as less of unitary 
actor. The different cases he explored were of relevance. (Migdal, 1988). Migdal 
continues to write in his later work about the state society approach and further develops 
the “State-in- Society” approach, where he attempts to decenter state authority while 
simultaneously retaining the normative idea of the state as a core unit of analysis. (White, 
2013: 2). 
 
The importance of the State Society approach lies in widening the lens through 
which civil society is viewed; looking at the civil society as a space where the state and 
the society are interacting together. This gives the study specific areas to look at, viewing 
the civil society as a public square where both the society and the state are engaged in 
continuous interaction that would define where the state is in terms of its social and 
economic development. Additionally, it gives attention to the diversity of interactions 
taking place between the state and the society. Focusing on the state society relations 
within the civil society as a space existing within the development field will offer a 
breakaway from the dichotomy of democratization or authoritarian resilience to 
understanding how development happen. 
 
Based on the gaps existing in the above-mentioned literature on development and 
civil society, I would be exploring the everyday changes that take place in the practices of 
the state rather than institutional changes. Which means, looking at the “everyday” 
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development of state authority into multiple scripts, narratives, and political activities. 
(White, 2013: 2). This is an attempt to understanding how development happens and how 
does the Civil Society influence the state practices. Relying mainly in my theoretical 




What I am trying to explore is the state society relations within the space of civil society 
and how its influence on state practices can explain where the state is in terms of 
economic and social development. This perspective would be focusing more on tracing 
the changes that happen within the state society relations which impact societal change 
within the sphere of the civil society. Here, civil society represents one of the many 
spaces/spheres where the state and the society interact, yet it has at its core the economic 
and social development. The theoretical framework depends mainly on Michael Mann 
and Joel S. Migdal. Mann’s “the sources of social power”, in addition to Migdal “Strong 
societies and weak states”. 
My research question is trying to capture the different factors that enable civil 
society in influencing state practices. The theoretical framework I use is one that is 
divided between two, one that feeds into the identification of the factors and another for 
the identification of state practices. First I will be using both Mann and Migdal for 
approaching the factors, and Migdal in approaching the state practices. It is useful to note 
that in my study I attempt to apply their theoretical approaches within a specific space 
within the state society relations represented in the civil society, it is important to note 
that their approach examines as wider scope, yet for the purpose of this study I would be 
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focusing more on applying their theoretical approach within the space of civil society in 
Egypt in the two development fields specified in chapter one. 
Both Mann and Migdal are relevant because both of them follow a historical 
narrative approach to the case studies they use. Also, how they approach the state is very 
important. While Mann looks at it as one source of social power, Migdal approaches it as 
a non-unitary actor. What they both offer is an understanding of how societies and states 
interact together to shape the development process be it economic or social (in terms of 
social control).  As explained below, Mann’s understanding of social power and how the 
networks of power are formulated is at the heart of the importance of his approach. And, 
Migdal’s fragmented social control, as explained below lies at the heart of the importance 
of his approach.  
Also both Mann and Migdal capture the moments of political change highlighting 
their influence on the progress and on state society relations. International actors also are 
integrated within both theoretical approaches. Thus, by looking through their theoretical 
approaches, factors I tackle within my main argument from the purpose of civil society 
actors, international support, as well as political change would be considered and hold 
explanatory power to the economic and social development of the state.  
 
First: The social forces of social power by Michael Mann: 
"Sources of social power" is an integral part of the theoretical framework because 
of multiple reasons. Most importantly, how Mann looks at the state not as the heart of any 
change or development, but rather as one of the major types of power networks. While he 
is focusing on the European example, he is carefully examining the historical narrative.  
Mann defines power as “the ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of 
one’s environment” (Mann, 1986: 6). While highlighting social power as Weber puts it “ 
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the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in position to carryout 
his own will despise resistance” (Ibid, 6). Mann here looks at forms of power as not a 
human need, but rather organizational means to fulfill other drives. In other words, he 
sees power not as an original human goal but rather it is a powerful means to other goals. 
Power in this way is not a resource, because resources in this sense are the media through 
which power is exercised. As mentioned above he looks through a socio-spatial and 
organizational level of analysis. This level of analysis addresses the central problems 
concerning organization, control, and communication. This is built on the assumption that 
societies are much messier than our theories of them. He stresses that the four sources of 
social power offer alternative organizational means of social control. He adds that power 
development has a discontinuous nature; new organizational techniques to control people 
and territories are always developed.  
He stresses on the sources of change and development, geographical ones and 
social ones, as emanating from within as well as outside the social and territorial space of 
the given society. Which resonates greatly with the role of International actors to be 
explored. In addition, Mann mentions that each power network tends to make its own 
unique and distinctive contribution to the society’s reorganization in different period. 
This last argument is also very relevant to the non-unitary path towards development this 
study is focusing on.  
 
Mann rejects the reference to society as a unitary actor, and he looks at it in a 
more loose way; a "society" comprised of "a loose confederation of stratified allies" 
(Mann, 1986; 14). Mann believes, "we can arrive at a better definition: A society is a 
network of social interaction at the boundaries of which is a certain level of interaction 
cleavage between it and its environment" (Ibid 1986:13). "Societies are constituted of 
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multiple overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power" (Ibid 1986:1). The 
relevance of Mann’s theory is that he follows a socio-spatial and organizational level of 
analysis, which resonates with how civil society is defined within this study.  Mann 
believes that it is the different power relations that make change happen. Also, as Tim 
Jacoby summarized social change for Mann: “Change is thus simultaneously driven 
forward by the goal-seeking behavior of individuals and mitigated by structural 
constraint.” (Jacoby, 2004). In this sense, Mann is integrating individual action into 
structural change. In His words: “A general account of societies, their structure, and their 
history can best be given in terms of the interrelations of what I will call the four sources 
of social power: ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP) relationships. 
These are (1) overlapping networks of social interaction, not dimensions, levels, or 
factors of a single social totality. (2) They are also organizations, institutional means of 
attaining human goals. Their primacy comes not from the strength of human desires for 
ideological, economic, military, or political satisfaction but from the particular 
organizational means each possesses to attain human goals, whatever these may be.” 
(Ibid, 1986: 1).  
Mann also outlines the importance of the local actors on states; he captures how 
the actors’ relations to the state define which type of state is emerging, he also explains 
how international influence is important to shaping the power network. He highlights the 
role of international events and actors entering the states paying little attention to its 
boundaries and how this influences the social and economic development of the state.  
 Understanding where do the four sources of power lie and how they interact 
together within the space of the civil society forming different power networks would 
contribute to understanding how local civil society actors and the international ones 
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enable the civil society to influence the state practices and thus defining the social and 
economic development of the state.  
What ties Mann to Migdal and makes the two theoretical approaches complement 
each other is the pursuit of the different actors of social control. They both highlight 
fluctuation of the role of the state within different time frames from having a small role 
and then the evolution in the role of the state. Where Mann examines how the different 
sources of social power interact together to form different power networks, Migdal 
attempts to understand how social fragmentation within developing countries has been of 
a persistent nature.   
Second: Strong societies and weak states by Joel S. Migdal: 
The relevance of Migdal’s approach is that he examines the dynamic relation 
between the state and the society in pursuit of social control. In this sense, Migdal’s 
approach is complementing Mann’s sources of social power, in which he is talking about 
the state as the political power, and then Migdal opens this network and starts exploring 
the nature of this power and its relation to society.  
In his theory, Migdal explains through “Strong Societies and Weak States”, the 
dynamic nature between the states and the societies within the developing countries, 
where the interaction between both exists within an environment of conflict. In his book, 
he used Egypt under Nasser as a case study applying the theory to it, the theory held 
reasonable explanatory power, and thus could be applied to the current environment of 
conflict existing within Egypt.   
He starts his book “strong societies and weak states” by rejecting the dependency 
theory, and modernization as well. He recognizes that the state is not the only player 
within the network of the social. And that there are many actors seeking control over 
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society or what is referred to as social control. What is interesting in his argument is that 
he mentions that what makes an actor strong does not necessarily mean the other actor is 
weak; in other words strength or weakness of the states does not necessarily indicate the 
strength or the weakness of the society. He stresses on the importance on understanding 
the influence of the different actors over the society. This struggle over social control is 
best explained in the below diagram extracted from his book. 
Figure 1: Strong societies and weak state by Joel S. Migdal 
.  
Source: Joel S. Migdal, “Strong societies and weak state” 
On one hand this figure explains Migdal’s model of relations between weak third 
world states and their societies where fragmented social becomes an inevitable and 
persistent result whatever road the state takes. The states use different strategies to 
influence the networks of power relations with the rest of the actors to exercise social 
control, which results in fragmented social control. This figure also recognizes the 
influence of the international context on the state society relations. He is talking about 
fragmentation of social control in the sense that people’s behavior does not get captured 
in the legislations and policies of the state. Although the state institutions penetrate the 
society and is found everywhere, yet there is always a disparity between the policies and 
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legislations and the consequences. This leads the states to adopt different politics of 
survival that accommodate social stability and thus leading them back to the fragmented 
social control.   
In this sense both Mann and Migdal recognize the importance of the different 
networks of power that get created between the different actors within the society, these 
networks of power are not exclusive to the state, it includes other actors, and these 
networks in their pursuit of social control are what determines the social and economic 
development of the state.  
Later on in 2001, Migdal developed an approach that complements his theoretical 
approach.  Migdal’s “State in Society” approach; where he looks at the processes that 
determine how societies and states create and maintain distinct ways of structuring day-
to-day life. In this approach he defines the state as “A field of power marked by the use 
and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization 
in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) 
the actual practices of its multiple parts” (Migdal 2001a, 15-16). This definition—
structured around the “practices” and the “image” of the state—showcases the core 
analytical and methodological propositions that run through and define the state-in-
society scholarship. This Definition of the state is the one I will be mainly using 
throughout the study. The state-in-society approach is the relevant to my research 
question because it frames the state within the day-to-day life, and thus, I focus on 
capturing the influence on state practices from recognition, support, and policy change.  
 
Accordingly, within the understanding that development of any society happens 
through the interaction of what Mann outlines as the sources of social power, then 
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identifying the interaction between the state and the society as outlined by Migdal in 
“strong societies and weak states” with the understanding of the state as put forward by 
Migdal in the “state-in-society” approach is the focus of the rest of this study.   
 
It is worth mentioning that both Mann and Migdal recognize that human 
characteristics are the source of everything, and they are the sources of power. It is very 
difficult to capture change and development without focusing on human beings as a 
source of power, and human behavior is not captured in legislations and policies.  
In conclusion, I will be using Mann’s and Migdal’s theoretical approaches as 
explained within the below figure: 
Figure 2: Outline of the theoretical framework: 
 
The figure above explains the research question, the main argument, as well as the 
sub-hypothesis. Where the different factors influencing the state practices from purpose, 
international actors, and political change are derived from both Michael Mann and Joel S. 
Migdal theoretical approaches. This means that both Mann’s and Migdal’s approaches 
contribute to identifying local civil society actors’ purpose, international actors, and 
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political change as factors that interact together and influence on state society relations 
over social control. This interaction then according to Mann forms a unique network of 
power that determines the social and economic development of the state.  While Migdal’s 
state-in-society approach contributes to looking at state practices as the media identifying 
the influence that took place by the different factors.  
The next Chapter would be mainly exploring briefly the historical context for state 
society interaction reflecting on the economic and social development from Nasser (1952) 
till the present date. Followed by two chapters comparing the influence of the previously 








Historical Context: State Society relations and Development in Egypt 
This chapter mainly aims at exploring the state society relations and development in 
Egypt since 1952 until the present date. Exploring these aspects would take into 
consideration the different phases that Egypt went through under the different Presidents 
since Nasser and until Al Sisy. First, the chapter will explore the meaning of development 
in general, then it’s understanding within the Egyptian context, this happens through a 
questionnaire exploring the perception of development by different civil society actors. 
Second, exploring the historical context From Nasser to Al Sisy.  
 
The Egyptian development strategy hasn’t been a consistent effort by the state.  
It has been changing dramatically over the years. This change had to do with the change 
in the regime that accompanies the change of the president. This change could be traced 
from Nasser with his socialist agenda, with Sadat and his “infitah” policies and the 
structural adjustment programs entering Egypt, then with Mubarak with the 2000s drive 
of integration within the world system on all levels, Moving then through the period of 
political instability and change starting from the uprising in 2011, the Muslim 
Brotherhood rule under the former president Mohamed Morsi, till finally reaching the 
election of president Al Sisy.  
 
Development in Egypt: definition, meaning, and perspectives 
Moving to exploring the different perceptions of development by people working in the 
field within the Egyptian context, I developed a questionnaire (see the questions in Annex 
1) and addressed it to different stakeholders working within the development field, 21 
respondents were recorded.  
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The questionnaire included people working in non-governmental organizations, 
associations, initiatives or groups, as well as social enterprises. I have received 21 
answers. Twenty-one respondents to such a broad concept is not a concrete indicator of 
how the people within the field view development, but it could still give insights about 
how development is perceived with some of the people working with the concept. The 
different answers can be summarized as follows: 
  
The main idea that all the answers included was the presence of movement from 
one condition to another. This movement –in some answers referred to as change- is lying 
at the core of all the definitions mentioned. However there were also variations within the 
definitions used, some were focusing on the individual as the main focus of the 
development process (which is the majority) while others were focusing more on the 
community, while one definition only was talking about the state level. Two of the twenty 
three respondents were very critical to the concept, mentioning that though they would 
describe themselves as working in the development field only -for lack of other terms -
they would not define the development process in a “positive” way (in their own terms). 
  
Some key concepts that were present within the different definitions were: 
1.  Sustainability: this term appeared in different definitions mentioned and it 
is attached to the type of impact the development has on the different communities. One 
of the respondents defined development as only sustainability. 
2.  Providing services: some respondents referred to providing services 
directly to the local communities as an integral part of the development process. 
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3.  Empowerment: this term was the term most frequently appearing in the 
different answers, and it was referring to empowerment with skills mainly, and 
empowerment to the marginalized individuals and communities. Most of the respondents 
who mentioned empowerment didn't tie it to a goal, yet some others tied the 
empowerment process with the goal of reaching something else, from solving community 
problems, to integration within the employment market. 
4.  Reform: also appeared frequently within the answers of the respondents 
mainly referring to political, economic, and social reforms being the purpose of the 
development process. 
  
What was interesting in one of the answers is that development was seen as a 
space of resistance to the corruption and injustice present within the state.   
What was also striking was the focus on the individual more than the community 
and very little focus on the impact on the state. In addition, social change and reform was 
the one most frequently appearing while economic reform or development was mentioned 
only once in the 21 respondents. 
The understanding provided above acts as a framework through which I will look 
at development within the rest of this study from the historical context presented below to 
the empirical evidence from the case studies.  
 
Egypt under Nasser: State Society relations, civil society, and development 
Egypt under Nasser was a unique case because both the society and state were shaped and 
reshaped several times. As much as it is difficult to track, which had more influence over 
the other; both the state and society evolved within a context of conflict. Different 
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scholars explored this phase, yet, Migdal in his book “strong societies and weak states” 
offered an account of what happened and how can it be interpreted.  
 
The strategy Nasser followed mainly focused on four pillars. First, 
Industrialization as the way to achieve modernization and improve the standard of living. 
Second, Agriculture should be modernized to increase productivity. Third, any opposition 
groups against the national targets or reforms were to be contained. Fourth, supporting 
small cultivators should be supported. (Harik , 1984: 43) 
 
As Migdal views it, Nasser together with the new leadership of the state had the 
intent of changing the structuring of the society. This change in the structure is channeled 
through “an extensive agrarian reform, attacking the very property rights that bolstered 
some of Egypt’s most dominant social Organizations”. (Migdal, 1988:182) 
 
Here Migdal challenges the dependency theory, and makes the point that although 
Egypt with its bureaucracy and homogeneity might be viewed as a place that has very 
rare instances when the periphery influences the core, the Egyptian State under Nasser 
was not successful in creating a strong and predominant state. 
 
Evidence to that could be found in the different policies that were implemented by 
Nasser during his period of ruling Egypt. Below is a summary of the different policies 
implemented and how it affected the state society relations: 
 
What Nasser started with was addressing the inequality that existed within the 
Egyptian society regarding landownership. He introduced agrarian reforms. Through 
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these reforms there was a redistribution of land and social structures prevailing changed 
with it. The transformation within the society was evident. Yet, the question that 
remained unanswered was whether these changes could result into the strong, 
predominate state Nasser aspired for or not.  
 
The challenges were not only in the redistribution of land, the challenge was in the 
rest of the policies implemented by Nasser in grounding his rule. Some of these 
challenging policies and decisions was reorganizing of political parties as well as 
arresting some of the key figures. Later on more challenging policies were implemented 
to create the social control Nasser aspires to have overseen by the strong predominate 
state. The highlights of the agrarian reforms could be summarized in: “ (a) the new 
tenancy in regulations, which lowered rents and afforded legal protection tenants, (b) the 
destruction of the big landowners as a powerful class in the Egyptian society, and (c) the 
gains in productivity on those fields included in the reforms”. (Ibid, 186) 
 
For Nasser to build the predominate and strong state to exercise social control, he 
depended on two policies: “relying mainly on the military, while elaborating the state 
agencies that would deliver the new strategies to take place of the old social 
organizations. “ (Ibid, 187) 
 
For implementing the previously mentioned policies, Nasser had to first make sure 
that his reliance on the army is to be trusted, and thus he appointed some of the free 
officers in the different governmental institutions. He also let go of some of the officers 
from the army itself. On the other hand, he arrested politicians, and created a system 
where he is relying mainly on the ministries and a political party under his control. This 
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party would act as the agent of mobilizing the people who were not mobilized enough 
behind the agrarian reforms. By creating this system, Nasser believed this is the only 
safety measure for the survival of the revolution.  
 
Replacing the landowners, who maintained social stability, Nasser created and 
made effective some institutions to maintain social control of the state. These institutions 
were: the agricultural cooperatives, the local councils, and the committees of twenty. 
Then came the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1962 as the single political party with the 
committees of twenty acting like its executive level.  (Ibid, 192) 
 
These institutional changes were believed to have changed the face of the villages 
in Egypt, it brought an end to a social order that was kept by the landowners, and replaced 
it by a social structure that was thought at this time to be organized and sustained by the 
state institutions. It was believed that the farmers were on daily basis facing the state and 
not some landowner. However, as much as it is tempting to think that this is because of 
the strength of the Egyptian state, the impact these institutions have is worth exploring. 
Migdal refers to this aspect by emphasizing that the very same institutions that were 
created to bring about state predominance, “perpetuated an environment of conflict and 
fragmentation of social control” (Ibid, 193) 
 
He attributes the failure of the state to impose its predominance to the social 
elements that were playing the rules of the institutions for their own gains. In the case of 
the agrarian reforms, Migdal identifies these social elements as the middle and rich 
peasants who dominated the institutions the state created to predominate the social 
structure. This unpredicted influence of the middle and rich peasants on the state 
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institutions affected the desired social control of the state, and attributed to its failure. 
Nasser found himself in a position having to curb this influence of the middle and rich 
peasants, and then the fight did not last for long. Because soon enough, Nasser realized 
that the two institutions he trusted with keeping the social control needs to be balanced as 
well. Any of these institutions gaining more power than it would only mean less social 
control as well as less predominance of the state and Nasser’s power. He feared the 
creation of “power centers” within the context of conflict and fragmentation. Soon 
enough after going after the middle and rich peasants with the committee of liquidation of 
feudalism, Nasser stopped and again relied on the very same middle and rich peasants for 
social peace. This reach out for the middle and rich peasants for social peace only meant 
taking away from the power of the ASU, which Nasser started to criticize publicly. In 
addition, by 1967, especially after the defeat of the army, Nasser starting decreasing the 
influence of the army as well.  
 
Nasser’s development strategy thus can be summarized in his attempts to create a 
centralized system of planning where the state is the strong actor leading the process with 
a top down approach. The agrarian reforms mentioned above as an example of state 
society relations during Nasser’s era also represent one of the pillars of his development 
strategy. Nationalization was also another pillar, where he was intending the curb 
international influence within Egypt. Nationalization as well was directed towards the 
banks so that restructuring of the financial resources management is shifted to the control 
of the state. Industrialization represented the final pillar of Nasser’s development strategy.  
As for the civil society, laws to regulate the civil society were not changed except 
after 3 years of the revolution. The law then changed and a new law was issued 284 for 
the year 1956. This law was particularly important because gave way to dissolve all the 
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NGOs and then re-establish with new structures under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs. Eight years later, another law was issued in 1964 to grant the state the full 
hegemony over civil society. Here it can be observed that there was a phase out of the 
role of the NGOs and incremental state control over civil society as a space. (Hassan, 
2012:) 
      
Finally, Nasser attempted to create a strong state with centralized power to lead 
the development strategy. This strategy with all its consequences paved the way to 
Sadat’s strategies that differed completely because of he took power in a war situation.  
 
Here if we apply Mann’s theory, we would look at an example of strong economic 
power represented by the landowners, being challenged by the newly emerging political 
power, this newly emerging political power represented in the state is strongly relying on 
the military power, and imposing its ideological power. And thus, at this phase of the 
development in Egypt, the military technology was the one force relating to the forming 
of social life and to the mode of economic production. The competition existing within 
the bi-polar international system also influenced the maneuvering space Nasser’s state 
had in its attempts to increase and widen the scope of the state control. 
 
Egypt under Sadat: State Society relations, civil society, and development 
Moving on to Sadat’s era, his presidency could be divided into two phases the state-led 
growth strategy then the opening up phase. Sadat came to power within a problematic 
context; the aid from the United States of America (USA) already stopped in 1965, 
indicators of an approaching military confrontation with Israel, and the failure in the 
creation of the strong centralized state Nasser was after.  Until the year 1974, not much 
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change within the development strategy took place. The main change that happened was 
in the restructuring of the public sector. From 1975 and until the end of his rule, Sadat’s 
development strategy changed drastically. The change in strategy came as a result of 
decrease in aid given to Egypt, decrease in investment rates, and the increase in the 
budget deficit. His new strategy was called “Infitah” meaning “opening up”; which meant 
opening up to the international society.  This new strategy aimed at increasing the foreign 
investment, decrease the state spending on the military, and decrease the deficit within the 
budget. It was characterized by the increased role of the private sector. Reassessing the 
legal framework to limit the nationalization and to give more benefits for the private 
sector to encourage investment. In addition to the free trade zones, an evident example 
here is Port-Said governorate. Receiving loans from the international organizations as 
well as other states, most importantly the United States of America (USA) after signing 
the 1979 peace treaty, was one of the main features of this phase. The different policies 
applied resulted in an increased inflation, and a decreasing growth rate. The deficit in the 
budget also increased.  
 
If we look closely at what both strategies of Nasser and Sadat, it could be seen 
that, as Shechter put it in his article “The Cultural Economy of Development in Egypt: 
Economic Nationalism “: Egypt was in a complicated situation under Sadat because of 
the “infitah” policies, because of the emergence of a hidden economy emerging alongside 
the official one acting on the unsolved economic problems. (Shechter, 2008: 573) 
When it comes to civil society, Sadat’s era contained both the continuation of the 
restricted policies of Nasser followed by opening up because of the aid coming in. Thus, 
the debate around foreign funding started to emerge. The role of NGOs was restored as 
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developmental and not only charitable and the influence of international NGOs started to 
grow. (Hassan, 2012:) 
 
Here the strength or the weakness of the state could be contested, yet what cannot 
be contested would be the dynamic nature that existed between the different power 
networks. During the first phase of Sadat’s rule the same pattern of interaction as the one 
dominated in Nasser’s era prevailed; Strong ties between political and military power, 
imposing ideological power, at the expense of the economic power networks, that started 
to collaborate with the state. The outstanding characteristic here would be the increasing 
role of the international actors, whether aid organizations, or countries. This affected 
greatly the power networks as explained above. 
 
Egypt under Mubarak: State Society relations, civil society, and development 
Mubarak inherited the legacy of both the rise of Islamist groups as well as the aid; Sadat 
left this legacy after his assassination. The impact of both affected the development 
strategy and the state society relations greatly during the Mubarak era. The International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) structural adjustment program that began in the 1980s started to 
gain more momentum in the 1990s. Unemployment was rising as the privatization of the 
state owned enterprises was increasing, “by 1999 it is said that one third of the state 
owned enterprises were partly or entirely privatized. Unemployment was rising between 
10% and 22%” (Langohr, 2004: 187). And the standard of living was falling; the 
percentage of the population living on or under the poverty line was also increasing. 
As the state was trying to consolidate its power, create what looks like democratic 
procedures, while trying to control both opposition and civil society. Trade unions and 
professional syndicates were no exception; different attempts of control reached them as 
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well. While the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence started increasing with civil society, the 
state’s attempts to control it increased.  (Langohr, 2004: 187) 
 
As for civil society under Mubarak’s rule, the first few years did not witness much 
of a change. Yet, international pressure increased to issue another law to regulate civil 
society, this law of the year 1999 was issued, yet it was found unconstitutional. As a 
replacement the law 84 of the year 2002 was issued. (Hassan, 2012: ) This law is still 
enacted until the present date in November 2016. In principle, the law was less restrictive 
than the previous ones, yet with thorough analysis it becomes clear that it has a restrictive 
nature and it give the state power and control over civil society. Some of the restrictions 
are the clauses relating to banning NGOs from working in anything political, or anything 
that is threatening national unity. This ambiguity in defining the terms gave the state more 
control over civil society and over the activities of the different NGOs. The role of 
international organizations started to increase during Mubarak’s era, and there was this 
common perception within the international community, especially the organizations 
operating in Egypt, that CSOs are agents of change. Having a major role in alleviating 
poverty and working on different societal problems as well as a catalyst for democratic 
transition. An example to this is the focus of the UNDP on the role of CSOs as agents of 
change in their Human Development Report (HDR) of 2008.  
 
Looking at the interaction here between the different power networks, the state 
during Mubarak’s era was monopolizing the judicial power and expanding it to 
legislating, it was also coordinating the activities of powerful civil society actors, which 
led to diffused economic power. While the state, also referred to the political power, was 
still in reliance on the military yet in a decreasing manner than the previous presidents. 
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This imbalance within the economic and military power led to an ambiguity on the 
ideological power, and thus economic and social development at this stage signified that 
change would be taking place to reorganize the networks of overlapping powers 
differently.  
 
Egypt Post the uprising of 2011: State Society relations, civil society, and 
development 
The period that followed the mass demonstrations taking place from the 25th of January 
2011 and until Mubarak stepped down was characterized by instability and the absence of 
clear priorities within the development field especially that this period was called the 
transition period led by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).  
 
With the first presidential elections within the transition phase the different 
candidates developed their programs within which they integrated their developmental 
priorities. The former president Mohamed Morsi was one of the candidates who 
developed within his program not only the development priorities but also the priorities 
within the first 100 days of his rule. Morsi was elected as the president in June 2012. The 
period of his rule was characterized by a high wave of societal activism in monitoring the 
performance of the presidency. An example to this activism is Morse Meter3, the website 
developed two social activists right after the elections, as an attempt to monitor the 
performance of the president and the progress he is making regarding the 100 days 
program he announced. As indicated by one of them, “the state back then represented in 
presidency initiated contact with us, and offered to send us more information so that we 
can updated the website. Our answer was no, because we do not want exclusive 
                                                
3 For more information on the website visit: http://morsimeter.com/en  
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information, we want them to publish it so the public can hold them accountable”. 
(Anonymous, 2nd December 2015) 
 
With the period of instability continuing and with the demonstrations taking place 
on the 30th of June 2013, and with the Army taking control again until the next 
presidential elections which brought about Al Sisy as the president in May 2014.  
Al Sisy development agenda was not clear from the beginning until Egypt 2030 
vision started.  
 
Egypt 2030 was introduced to the Egyptians together with the world in 
International Economic Forum in Sharm El Shiekh in March 2015. After the launch of 
the strategy in the International Economic Forum, an official launch took place and 
President Al Sisy attended and gave a speech in February 2016. Going about the vision 
would be through exploring two aspects, the first is the content, and the second is the 
process.  
The content of the strategy: 
The government under this strategy commits itself to working on the three fields: 
Economic development, Competitiveness of markets, and Human Capital. In this sense 
the state is influenced greatly by the international standards of development. 
Specifically the influence of the Sustainable Development Goals “SDGs”. The strategy 
aims at achieving higher growth rates, increasing investment, reducing unemployment, 
increasing exports; it also addresses local energy sources to maximize them. It also 
focuses on health and education. The strategy talks about university, as well as the 
health system, it talks about the effectiveness of the administrative system of the state, it 
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also mentions the cuts in government spending. It adds section to talk about the reforms 
in the telecommunication and information technology sector. It puts women 
empowerment and gender equality as a priority. Though the Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) were put as clear as possible, methods through which these will be measured as 
well the mechanism through which these KPIs will be achieved was not made clear and 
concise.  
 
As mentioned above, the strategy seems to be very much affected by the 
international agenda for development, the terms and concepts used are terms and concepts 
that are derived from the different indexes used to measure the development process of 
the different states, and easily detected resemblance would be the Human Development 
index (HDI) as well as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 
timing of the presentation as well makes it more probable that this strategy is one made 
for international consumption, which leaves us with very minimal prediction on how will 




Throughout the in depth interviews conducted, especially the ones focusing on the 
innovation field, I was told that key figures from CSOs or startups were invited. In 
addition, to the key figures within each of the fields the strategy is addressing. “The 
Ministry of Planning (MoP) hired a consultancy to facilitate the process of developing the 
vision. The process included sessions with the key actors within the fields where the 
Ministry presents the indicators developed under each field, opens to receive feedback on 
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them, then finally develop the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the indicators.” 
(Anonymous, 14 June 2016).  An example to how inclusive the process was came from 
one of the interviews; “I had a suggestion to integrate an indicator within the strategy, and 
based on the inclusion of this indicator I was able to later on work with a governmental 
entity who is adopting the strategy”. (Ibid, 2016) 
 
Some interviewees view this process as participatory and to an extent inclusive. 
The vision, as vague as it is, still gives a sense of direction to the development of Egypt if 
adopted by all the different state institutions. It is also seen as a limiting factor to 
mismanagement of resources.  
 
The process of the launch however was challenging, since the soft launch in the 
International Economic Forum was the one addressing the international society, yet 
within the launch on the national side, on the 24th of February 2016, where the president 
addressed the population with a speech, not mentioning at all the strategy or its role 
within the development process. The focused became more on the accomplishments of 
the presidency, in addition the role of the citizen in supporting the state. Even the banner 
behind the president did not include the logo of the vision but rather the banner had 
“Youth Year” on it, which is based on the presidency announcing 2016 as the “Youth 
Year”. 
 
As for civil society during this phase, this period witnessed different forms of 
organizing within the space of civil society. First of all, the rise of different movements 
whether political or social gave rise to different forms of resistance to the control of the 
state to the NGOs. Not only political and social movements, new forms of organizing 
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started appearing since 2011. These new forms took different forms from what was called 
community based initiatives and informal groups and initiatives, from their name they 
were not following the legal framework of the state while working daily within the 
society. Other form included co-working spaces, startups, and social enterprises 
registered as companies yet working within the social field.  
 
Different attempts to issue a new law regulating civil society and NGOs, yet until 
the moment nothing passed. Yet, it is worth mentioning that there is a draft being 
discussed these days, November 2016, that is much more restrictive than any previous 
law. It mentions criminal charges reaching jail for 5 years, in addition to fines, as well as 
restrictions not only on foreign funding but also on the national one. And finally, it brings 
the role of the Ministry of Interior officially as part of a committee approving the 
different funds. The danger of this law, if it passes, it threatens the survival of the NGO 
sector. 
 
Wrapping up the post Mubarak era is challenging, since there were fluctuating 
networks of power, that kept on reorganizing themselves yielding different social and 
economic development that changes very rapidly. Yet, if an account could be given to the 
current situation, it would be that the reliance of the political power over the military 
power is restored to the beginning of the age of Nasser, in addition to ambiguity 
surrounding the economic and ideological powers.   
 
In conclusion of this chapter, throughout the different phases led by the different 
presidents and forces, the social and economic development of the state varied greatly. 
Yet, the common factor was the different, successful and failed, attempts to widen the 
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scope of control of the state represented in the political power allied with the military 
power.  Each President, as well as the dominant ideological power has articulated this 
differently within the different phases. Economic power however have been leading to 
societal influence on how the different policies are implemented and thus influencing the 
outcome, which eventually ends up quite different than the one imagined by the state. The 
dilemma was always state-led growth versus opening up.  The role of external pressure 
and international forces was very evident during the different eras. Relating to the current 
social and economic development of Egypt, it is very difficult to tell what type of 
reorganization is taking place. Because of the different indicators pointing at 
contradicting directions. Some point at the increasing role and power of the political and 
military powers. Another is pointing out to the role of the economic power. This is 
significant if we look at Egypt 2030 vision, yet it is too soon to tell whether this will yield 
to the balance between the state and the society or not, simply because the different state 
entities do not have one stance towards it. In addition, there are no indicators that the state 
is intending to mainstream this strategy. Yet, it is fair to acknowledge the difference in 
terms of the process through which this strategy was development, its future remains 
ambiguous though. Civil society remained throughout the different phases of the different 
presidents as a space of contested control between the state and the society, always being 
affected by the presence of pressure from the international community, this happened 
during Sadat’s era as well as Mubarak’s.  
 
The next two chapters would be going in depth with two fields to continue 
examining the different factors enabling the civil society to influence state practices, as 
well as attempting to understand the social and economic development of Egypt within 
the current state. Within the chapters, I will mainly explore the different definitions and 
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understandings of the different stakeholders, mapping them, as well as exploring the 







Innovation for Development in Egypt 
This field of innovation has been gaining attention in Egypt during the early 2000s, yet 
with the technological advancement happening in the world, more and more focus of the 
international community on the concept of innovation gave momentum to its rise in Egypt 
as well. Since 2011 and on, more focus on innovation and entrepreneurship was starting 
as per mentioned in all the interviews. Only two organizations from the 11 interviewed 
were operating in Egypt within the field before 2011. The two organizations go back to 
2003 and 2005, while the rest came around the year 2013. Despite the different political 
changes that are taking place in Egypt since 2011 this field was one of the few fields 
within development that were flourishing. Exploring why this happened in addition to 
understanding the role of international actors and the economic purpose around which the 
organizations within this field are clustered is the purpose of this chapter. In addition to 
understanding the influence all of this have on the state practices and thus on the social 
and economic development of the state.   
 
Since this field is a young field in Egypt, not a lot of literature is available within 
this field. In my analysis I depended mainly on reports produced by the major 
stakeholders within the field. Yet, most importantly I depended on primary I data 
collected through: in depth interviews with 11 governmental, NGOs, Startups, Investors, 
and other relevant stakeholders within the field. I also developed a questionnaire that 
outlines the understanding of innovation and disseminated the questionnaire among 21 
stakeholders working within the field.  
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This chapter will outline first the understanding of the term, map the different 
stakeholders and their influence, explore the influence of international actors, and then 
finally look in depth in two case studies.  
 
Understanding Innovation in Egypt 
The term has been used in different ways in Egypt. I observed that the term itself was 
referred to in different ways while I was conducting the interviews. This realization led 
me to design the questionnaire to reach to other stakeholders within the field and 
understand how they view this field and type of value they see in it.  In Annex 3 are the 
demographics of the respondents of the questionnaire, and in Annex 1 there are the 
questions of the questionnaire.  
 
The highlights of the answers were: 61% of the respondents chose the Oslo 
manual third edition definition as the definition closest to their work. According to this 
definition innovation is seen as “ the implementation of a new or significantly improved 
product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational 
method in business practices, workplace organization or external relations.” (OECD, 
2005). This in itself is an indicator of the focus of the different respondents on the 
economic aspect of the concept as the international exposure of the different respondents 
to the questionnaire. According to this definition there are different types of innovation: 
product innovation, process innovation, marketing innovation, and organizational 
innovation.  
 
Though the respondents mainly focused on the economic purpose or value of 
innovation when asked within the questionnaire about what type of value does a 
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program/project/initiative have to hold to be considered innovative, the answers came as 
follows: Economical 71.4%, Societal 76.2%, Political 33.3%, Technological 52.4%, 
Scientific 38.1%, Environmental 52.4%, Other 19%.  
Figure (3): percentage of innovation values  
 
Source: Data analyzed from the questionnaire 
Looking at these percentages might give an indicator to what the different 
stakeholders focus on when they work in their day-to-day activities within the field. Most 
of the respondents then are more focused on the societal and economic value. The 
political value gained the lowest percentage with 33%. This indicates the value the 
respondents see for their work within the innovation field as societal and economic. The 
societal value of innovation was articulated clearly in an interview with a NGO acting as 
an incubator for innovative startup within the field of scientific research under the 
condition that they have “social impact, this social impact could be whatever, an example 
is employing staff members from a certain underprivileged area.” (Anonymous, 27th June 
2016) 
 
This resonates with what I observed in different events I attended, organized by 
some state agencies as well as by NGOs the invitees and participants are a variety of 
people working within innovation from the economic aspect or the societal aspect. An 
 50 
example of an event organized by a governmental agency would be the event organized 
by ASRT, on the 18th of July 2016, where the list of speakers included 12 speakers, from 
both civil society and private sector, only 2 of which were speaking about social 
innovation. While the rest were talking more about the economic value of innovation 
within different fields whether technology, industry, or investment.  
 
Looking closer at the societal value this field might encompass, all 21 respondents 
mentioned that innovation is important to development, justifying their answer with either 
the economic need as someone mentions, “ With such current progressive economies you 
either innovate or die. The complexity in social and economic context requires innovative 
solutions, projects and initiative to create a sound impact.” (Anonymous, September 
2016) Others link it through highlighting the importance of sustainability; “Innovation 
allows us to design development projects that are sustainable, scalable and that achieve 
better results. Innovative approaches include all stakeholders in the problem-solving, 
incorporate new technologies and follow best practices, clearly define success criteria and 
monitoring and valuation mechanisms that record and ensure success”. (Ibid) Some 
others relate it to the complexity of the social problems the society is witnessing and the 
need for the society to move in a creative way; “To solve complicated problems in the 
society, we need unusual, new innovative solutions.” “It allows for a flexible system that 
facilitates creation for prosperity”, and “It is very important to discover new territories of 
development and how the development endeavors can serve the communities in a more 
sustainable way”. (Ibid)Bringing different examples of countries that were able to break 
away from the low middle-income trap to the high income through innovation also 
highlighted the link between innovation and development. While others highlighted the 
importance of the socio-economic value of innovation for the society.  
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What was also striking in the respondents’ answers is the linkage they make 
between innovation and entrepreneurship and also economic prosperity. Which reaches 
sometimes the level of equating innovation with entrepreneurship in a way that diffuses 
the meaning of innovation from its essence. This was an evident trend in the interviews I 
conducted with investors focusing on innovative startups (anonymous, 21 June 2016), as 
well as the interviews I conducted with some startups (direct beneficiaries of NGOs, 
incubators, and investors within the field), which could not define what innovation is yet 
they articulated its importance for entrepreneurship (anonymous, 1st July 2016).  
 
The mix up between innovation and startups is not found in academia. Also, I was 
able to trace the difference between the two fields from the interviews I conducted with 
Academics within the field of innovation, and with founding members of companies 
specialized only in innovation. Their perception of it is that: Innovation can exist within 
any field as long as it offers a new way/method/process/idea of doing things or a 
significantly improved way. And this divides innovation as a field into two aspects: 
innovation management, research and development, and finally academia. In one 
interview a founder of a company working on innovation defined for me innovation as 
“an adaptation of technology more or less” (anonymous, 14th June 2016). They also 
made the distinction between innovation and invention; the economic value is relevant 
here. There is a distinction that could be used to differentiate between the two as 
expressed by one of the interviewees, there are two types of entrepreneurs the ones for 
necessity and the ones for opportunity (Ibid). The ones for opportunity are the ones 
relevant to the innovation field. However, when it comes to the questionnaire more than 
50% of the respondents have seen that entrepreneurs are not by default innovators. And 
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they justified this with different views on who entrepreneurs are and what they do, one of 
which was: “Entrepreneurs can just be cash cows investing in businesses that generate 
money without innovation but all this reflects on the industry in which they operate on the 
long run, because on the short run it's getting bills paid.” 
 
Economic value of innovation lies within different spheres. The state identifies the 
economic value of innovation on several levels. In addition to the catching up with the 
international trend that values knowledge based and innovation based economies that are 
highlighted in several reports on the international level as well as the regional level as the 
key to increasing production, competition, and creating more jobs. An important report 
that highlights the influence the transformation process will have on Arab economies is 
the World Bank report “Transforming Arab Economies: Traveling the Knowledge and 
Innovation Road” in 2013. Apart from catching up with the international trend, there is 
the investment element attached to it, a state that promotes innovation specially within the 
entrepreneurship field is a state that is attractive from investors within the field from 
incubators as well as venture capital. The third reason outlined is also job creation, 
especially in developing countries where unemployment is on the rise; accordingly 
moving the responsibility of creating jobs to the university graduates a shift to them 
having the responsibility of creating this opportunity through innovation and 
entrepreneurship. From the different interviews with different youth entrepreneurs they 
do not see the job of the government to create jobs for the unemployed, yet it’s the job of 
the government to create a context around which the unemployed can create their own 
opportunities (Anonymus, 21st May 2015).  This is an interesting shift in the 
understanding of the role of the state, shaped by the rising trend promoting innovation 
and entrepreneurship in Egypt. From the government side, the different interviews tackled 
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the increasing production more as the economic value they put forward. Job creation is 
the one reason that dominated the two interviews conducted with two different 
international organizations funding innovation and entrepreneurship in Egypt.  
 
The understanding of innovation within the Egyptian case is quite similar between 
governmental and non-governmental organizations. The economic purpose and value of 
the field is believed to be the driving force behind the growing importance of the field. 
Though more respondents and interviewees were coming from civil society as well 
private sector, there were some respondents from different governmental organizations 
sharing similar understanding of the economic value. In addition to the increasing number 
of events and conferences organized by the government to promote innovation, an 
example is “innovation in government” organized on the 11th and 12th of October 2015 
by the Ministry of Planning (MoP) and organized by T204.  
 
Mapping of different stakeholders within innovation 
The respondents of the questionnaire outlined the different stakeholders within the 
Egyptian innovation field as: “Incubators, private sector, startups, NGOs, Academia, 
research institute, government, International donors.” which resonates with the 
international understanding of the important stakeholders or as mentioned in the ESCWA 
report as “system actors” within the innovation field as: these are research performing 
organizations, local authorities, industry, business and civil societies. (Radwan, 2015: 6) 
 
                                                
4 (An association of approximately 700 Egyptian alumni of global business schools such as Harvard, 
Stanford, Oxford, London Business School, INSEAD and many others), or those who are currently working 
or have worked at one of the 4 leading consulting firms McKinsey, Bain, BCG and Strategy. 
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The different mapped categories exist as governmental organizations, as NGOs, or 
as Companies and startups. Below is a brief explanation of the different categories 
existing. 
Governmental organizations within the innovation field: 
Different Ministries involved: 
The Ministry of Higher Education, The Ministry of Trade and Industry, The 
Ministry of Scientific Research, The Ministry of Communication, and the Ministry of 
Investment.  
Funding governmental organizations:  
1. “Science Technology and development fund, established in 2007.  
2. Research, Development, and Innovation Program (RDI), established after 
the EU-Egypt science and technology agreement of 2005. 
3. The Academy of Scientific Research, and Technology (ASRT) 
4. Industrial Modernization Center (IMC), within the ministry of trade and 
industry.  
5. The Information Industry Development Agency (ITIDA), within the 
ministry of communication. “ (Radwan, 2015: 15) 
6. Technology Innovation and Entrepreneurship Center (TIEC), founded in 
2010.  
 
Figure (3) below is extracted from a report for ESCWA by Amr Radwan, October 
2015. It is explaining the different roles the government is playing within the innovation 
field. In addition to their structure.  The figure maps the different roles the governmental 
organizations perform. From policymaking, developing strategies, road maps and 
 55 
foresight, moving on the organizational roles played by the government, and the 
evaluation. 
Figure (4): STI main components  
 (source: ESCWA report, Radwan, October 2015) 
 
The first look at this figure might give the impression that the state is having a 
high degree of controlling the innovation field. Yet, when I conducted the fieldwork, 
especially when attending events organized by the government, it was obvious that the 
government is relying greatly on civil society as well as private sector in most of the roles 
it performs. Examples to this were evident for me while attending, as an example, an 
event organized by the ASRT on the 18th of July in Alexandria, where the president of 
 56 
the Academy in his opening speech after outlining the role of the academy, started 
highlighting the importance of collaboration between civil society and the state within the 
field.  Also, throughout the event the different state officials giving speeches were 
stressing on the challenge the government has with reaching out to the right beneficiaries, 
which is something civil society is good at. In this sense, the event was mainly attended 
by civil society organizations (local and international) as well as private sector.  This 
resonates with what Migdal talk about from the state’s creation of different institutions 
does not necessarily mean they have control over the society. This highlights the 
importance of exploring the other existing players within the field. Before doing so, it is 
important to highlight that when the government started a project on mapping the 
different stakeholders within the field, they reached out to a startup working in the field to 
be the implementing partner. Here I am talking about the partnership between TIEC and 
Innovety in Cairo Innovates5. Below is a brief mapping of other relevant actors:   
  
Other actors within the system include: 
1. Incubators, There exists incubator in the private sector such as Flat6lab, 
within universities such as: venture lab within the American University in Cairo, as well 
within civil society such as GESR and Nahdet Al Mahroussa (NM). 
2. Venture Capital and investors an example is Cairo Angels.  
3. Innovation Enablers: These include startups and companies such as 
Yomken.com as well CSOs such as ECASTI 
International actors: 
                                                
5Egypt Innovate is the online innovation hub for Egypt, where innovators and entrepreneurs get inspired, 
educated and connected. We will take you on a journey of inspirational and educational content, practical 
tools and templates, access to networks from the innovation hubs and spaces around the globe, for more 
information visit: http://egyptinnovate.com/en/intro 
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As the funds from international actors increasing with regards to innovation, as the 
term is becoming frequently used whether it is defined properly or not.   
 
When I asked about the wave of funds directed towards innovation and 
entrepreneurship one interviewee saw it as “a way to neutralize the youth politically, and 
move away from the revolutionary and radical change” (anonymous, June 2016) This 
argument though it might hold some truth to it, other interviewees countered that 
argument mentioning that the international actors have been in the field for a long time 
and have been in partnership with the Egyptian government to work on the innovation 
system since 2005. An example on that is EU-Egyptian Scientific Research agreement in 
2005. In addition to the bilateral agreements Egypt has with the different countries that 
includes the implementation of joint activities relating to the field of innovation even 
before 2011. Though one cannot deny the increasing funding opportunities directed to the 
field since 2013, especially the funds by the USAID in the form of the SEED program in 
2016. During these past few years the Egyptian cooperation worldwide has increased 
regarding the innovation field, according to the ESCWA report, the following map shows 










Figure (5): Egypt’s International Cooperation Capacity within STI  
Source (Radwan, 2015: 22) 
What the figure above reveals is the wide network Egypt has with the international 
community within the innovation field. These partnerships cover reforms to the legal 
structure, promoting funding opportunities, supporting of civil society and/or startups 
within the field.  
 
In an interview I had with a staff member of an international organization 
partnering with the Ministry of Trade and manufacturing, s/he highlights that the purpose 
of working in this field mainly is “promoting business innovation for startups as a 
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stepping stone to creating more jobs. The rationale behind partnering with the 
government is sustainability.” (Anonymous, September 2016). S/he adds that the 
international actors working within the field of innovation as well as other fields have 
periodic meetings to discuss their progress and how to collaborate.  
 
After finishing my 11 in depth interviews within this field and attending more than 
7 events organized by the state and civil society, I observed that two clusters are shaped 
in Egypt within the field of innovation. One cluster around the Ministry of 
Communication and another around the ministry of Trade and Industry together with the 
Ministry of Scientific Research. Each of these clusters includes: IGOs, INGOs, NGOs, 
individuals categorized as experts, incubators, startups, and companies. The two clusters 
are not mutually exclusive; a certain level of coordination takes place because some of 
the stakeholders exist in the two clusters. This classification was also mentioned in two 
important interviews one with a former government employee, and one with a founder of 
a company who managed to work with both clusters. Also in one of the events organized 
by ASRT, one of the employees highlighted his frustration in his different failed attempts 
to work with the Ministry of Communication though they are doing the same thing as 
TIEC (anonymous, July 2016). However, this level of cooperation is kept at a low level, 
this was evident in several events attended, where exchange of information on the 
services the government offers was not clear to the members of the other cluster.  
 
It is important to note here the ties existing between the network working within 
the field from state actors, civil society, as well as private sector. It is what the different 
interviewees called “the ecosystem”. This network or ecosystem works as the medium for 
transfer of knowledge and creating a new cluster of economic power dynamics that could 
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shape the type of the economic development of Egypt as knowledge based economy (as 
put in a clause within the Egyptian constitution and in Egypt 2030 vision). 
 
The sustainability of this network and the pattern of interaction it creates is 
something worth exploring to understand if it is -according to Mann’s theory- creating a 
pattern or is it coincidence.  
 
Sustainability of innovation 
Innovation is viewed in most of the interviews I conducted as a trend that will last longer 
than the rest of the trends that started within the development field. For some, it is 
because of the economic impact it has (discussed above), it becomes more sustainable. 
Others look at it from a support perspective, and they view this trend as supported by the 
government since the establishment of TIEC.  
 
Another view for why this trend is there to stay for longer, is the opinion of one of 
the investors within the tech startups who mentions that “this field is different, especially 
the innovation within entrepreneurship. Because this is not free money, the money that is 
invested within this sector is "accountable" money; meaning that the investors pay great 
attention to how to make sure their money will either come back, or flourish. Which is a 
major different between innovation and other fields within development.” (Anonymous, 
14 June 2016)  
 
On the other hand the only interviewee who viewed innovation as any other trend 
and would fade away was with the employee of the international organization. Yet, there 
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was an agreement that for this field to be sustainable it has to overcome certain challenges 
that are inherent within the field, below are some of these challenges.  
 
A challenge that appeared in all the interviews I conducted even in the ones with 
the governmental employees was the legal framework. A pressing challenged mentioned 
in several interviews is “the absence of laws that protect the startups general and more 
specifically in case of bankruptcy.” (Anonymous, 14 June 2016). Also relevant to the 
legal framework are the absence of unified strategy that gathers all the ministries and 
governmental entities together, but rather the presence of an innovation strategy here and 
there without the existence of structure channels of cooperation between the different 
entities. (Anonymous, September 2016) 
 
Different organizations, whether private companies or NGOs, expressed in the 
interviews that their role is not necessarily the role they would like to actually do, instead 
they are offering the different services that are supposed to be offered by the government. 
Some others identify their role as like one of the interviewees saw his role as “facilitator 
between the government and the society. And sometimes between the academia, the civil 
society, the industry, and the government. (Anonymous 14 June 2016) 
 
“The absence of an educational system supporting innovation” (Anonymous, 
September 2016) as expressed by one of the interviewees, the ministry of higher 
education has a very important role in revisiting the university curriculum to integrate 
innovation and creativity, yet this does not happen. In addition to the importance of 
supporting the university professors in their innovative attempts and patents. 
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The rigidity existing within the governmental entities working in the field was 
expressed in three interviews. Two of which were working in governmental 
organizations, a ministry and a research center, and they both had to leave because they 
could not adapt to the limiting internal policies and bureaucracy. They both saw value of 
working with the government and on influencing the government yet, from outside the 
government, either from the civil society or from the private sector. The third example on 
the other hand expressed that “I loss of momentum to influence the decision making 
process and started adapting to the slow and limited pace of the governmental 
organization, which is not something I like, I want my startup spirit back”  (anonymous, 
20 June 2016) 
 
“Change that takes place with the government is incremental change, and not 
radical or big change. It has to be incremental so that the trust building process is not 
disrupted.” (Anonymous, September 2016).  This was a challenge was also highlighted in 
several interviews.  
 
The sustainability aspect depends greatly on how this network of power relations 
decides to reorganize and address them, According to Mann. Also, if the political power, 
the state, decides to widen its scope of control, this network might lose its dynamics as it 
is right now, and different forms might occur that might signify fragmented social control 
of the state, according to Migdal.  
 
Exploring the influence the interaction within this network is examined through 
two case studies. Mainly to track the influence civil society has on state practices in terms 
of recognition, support, and policy.  
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First Case Study 
Young Innovators Awards (YIA) 
This case stands out as one of the earliest attempts to work on innovation with direct 
beneficiaries within the Egyptian context. This program has been operating since 2004 
under the umbrella of Nahdet Al Mahrousa (NM), the first incubator of early stage social 
enterprise founded in Egypt as an NGO in 2003.  
NM as an organization represents also an example of how different local actors 
organize when they see a pressing need, and creates their own relevant structure. It started 
in 2003 when the founder of NM had an idea of creating a platform to support social 
development ideas.  
 
As defined on their official website: The program mainly aims at improving the 
research and development in Egypt. They do so through financial and technical support of 
innovators either by supporting their graduation projects (the ones from natural sciences 
faculties within public universities), or supporting the prototypes to be turned into 
products. The program worked in 19 Egyptian public universities, 87 faculties of natural 
sciences. The program partnered with a large number of businesses as well as 
governmental organizations. The program worked with more than 3800 young 
innovators. “Since inception in 2004, 670 graduation projects and 24 prototype awards 
were distributed.” (YIA, 2016) 
 
The content of their program includes two sections. The first is mainly about 
“awards of excellence in undergraduate research”, where they hold competitions for the 
graduation projects of students within natural sciences faculties in national universities. 
Whoever wins the competition is awarded a financial award to pursue their project. The 
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second is the “prototype design awards and commercialization” which moves beyond the 
graduation projects to awarding prototypes to be turned into products. The financial 
support here is more than the one for the graduation project awards. The program has 
within its mandate capacity development component as well as networking component to 
raise the capacities of the young innovators as well as connect them to the relevant key 
actors within their field of interest that could help them further develop and turn their 
projects into startups. Different success stories could be traced to YIA, one of the 
examples could be “Integreight”6 which was awarded in one of the years and moved to 
the next level of being incubated, then went through the whole entrepreneurial cycle and 
now is a well established company in the field of Information and communications 
technology (ICT).  
 
Within the framework of this program, YIA has partnered with different 
governmental, international, and private organizations within the field. The governmental 
organizations cooperating with the program as put forward by the founder of the program, 
in my interview with him on 21st of June 2016, are: “National Research Center, the 
Academy for Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT), the Ministry of Scientific 
Research, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Cooperating with the government for 
the program was either with the governmental entities that have the budget to contribute 
with, or technical support. The different partnerships with the different governmental 
entities resulted in both negative and positive impact on the program and the 
beneficiaries.” He continued to explain further what he meant, an example of a successful 
cooperation was the partnership with ASRT, in which ASRT financially supported 
different startups or prototypes, yet this support was always facing legal challenges of 
                                                
6 Integreight is a company in the ICT industry, concerned with proposing innovative solutions for end users 
using technology. 
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whether they should have equity within the startup or not, and how to ensure that the 
money they invest in the different projects are not wasting the public money. The 
different staff within the governmental organizations might have ambition to develop 
different projects yet, this ambition does not come to reality because of the legal units 
within these entities outlining the impossibility of such acts under the current laws 
governing the ecosystem. This legal dilemma sometimes was sometimes solved through 
the partnership of these governmental organizations with local NGOs that can the 
different projects avoiding the waste of public money challenge.  (Anonymous, 21 June 
2016)  
 
Cairo Innovates is an example of the outcome of the long-standing partnership 
between YIA under the umbrella of NM and ASRT. Cairo innovates mainly takes place 
November of every year as an exhibition inviting all the relevant stakeholders nationally, 
regionally, and internationally to promote the culture of invention and innovation (ASRT, 
2016). YIA and ASRT partnered for this event for two consecutive years, yet this year, 
2016, ASRT implemented the exhibition on its own with the sponsorship of different 
CSOs most importantly Masr AlKhier.  
 
Basically as outlined by one of the founders of the program and one of the 
employees working on the program, the influence can be summarized in being the ability 
of the different governmental partners to change some of their internal policies to 
accommodate the needs of the program. Another is the involvement of some 
governmental officials from public universities and ministries in the evaluation of the 
different projects of the students. Another example is the participation of the Minister of 
Scientific Research to the yearly exhibition YIA implemented in Partnership with ASRT. 
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They were thus not only recognized by the state as a partner in signing different 
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), they were also supported technically by 
university professors and financially by funding some aspects of the program.  
 
The two interviewees traced this influence to several reason, first, Inclusiveness of 
different partners and reaching out to them by the staff members of YIA. The program 
partnered with 19 public universities, several ministries, as well as several semi 
governmental organizations. This widens the areas of cooperation as well as builds trust 
with the government within different areas of collaboration.  
 
Second, The duration of the partnership is also a factor, the program operated for 
more than 10 years. Through which the program was partnering with different 
governmental entities that contributed to acquiring flexibility, trust, as well as mutual 
learning within the partnership. The longer the partnership is the more likely the different 
partners develop realistic expectations from each other.  
 
Third, How focused and clear the objective of the program makes the partnership 
more solid and guided by the objective. This has to be accompanied by acknowledgement 
of change that happens within the framework of the partnership over the years, and 
looking at it with guidance for more shaping the future partnerships.  
 
Last, The presence of a critical mass from civil society, investors, incubators, 
entrepreneurs, and innovators influences the government when it comes to recognizing 
the field, its needs, as well as the different actor in addition to having to respond to these 
needs in the form of support because of the presence of this critical mass.  
 67 
In conclusion to this case study, political change has minor impact on the 
program, the economic nature of the program made the partnership with the state easier 
and recognition and trust building was not lengthy, soon enough the state offered both 
technical and financial support. The international actors here are having indirect impact 
on the program through working on innovation together with the government without 
being involved directly with the program.  
 
The next case study mainly explores the change in policy within innovation driven 
by civil society, represented by ECASTI.  
 
Second Case Study 
The Egyptian Center for Advancement of Science, Technology, and 
Innovation (ECASTI) 
The Egyptian Center for the Advancement of Science, Technology and Innovation 
(ECASTI)7 is a start-up non-governmental foundation aiming to enhance the framework 
of Science and Innovation in Egypt and monitor the country’s performance in this field. 
(ECASTI, 2014) 
 
How they define shows how they try to capture the essence of the entrepreneurial 
context by defining themselves as a “start-up” while also stressing on their nature as a 
foundation. In an interview with two of the staff members on 27th of June 2016, they 
mentioned that they do not interact directly with the innovators. What they work mainly 
with is enhancing the ecosystem of innovation in Egypt. (Anonymous, June 2016) 
 
                                                
7 Registered under the MoSS: number 9312 for the year 2013 
 68 
They view their work within this critical phase in Egypt’s history essential to 
integrate Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) into national development policies 
and the economic reform agenda, using the efforts of all actors and stakeholders to build 
Egypt’s renaissance. For them, government cannot be expected to take the full 
responsibility for the scientific research and Innovation System; rather, the private sector 
and civil society organizations have a key role to play in driving STI in Egypt.  
     
In this context, the role of ECASTI becomes particularly important. As they 
mention in in their mission, mainly they are founded to “consolidate and increase the 
importance of STI and its outcomes in Egyptian society in order to achieve sustainable 
socio-economic development that is commensurate with the aspirations of this nation.”  
 
What they try to influence is always the policy level. An example worth 
mentioning here is the influence ECASTI had on the Egyptian Constitution. The basic 
clauses ECASTI wanted to integrate were derived from the Ministry of Scientific 
Research Strategy that was developed in 2006. First they had several attempts to lobby 
the committee that drafted the 2013 constitution under the rule of the former president 
Mohamed Morsi. Yet, their attempts were not successful and they could not integrate the 
clauses they wanted within the constitution. As put by the staff responsible for the 
lobbying, the committee invited them to give a presentation, they seemed to have 
understood what have been said, recognized its importance, yet when the constitution was 
drafted the clauses were not added. However, after the overthrow of the former President 
Mohamed Morsi, a process of drafting a new constitution started with a new 
constitutional committee. ECASTI was more successful this time in lobbying for: the 
importance of scientific research for national sovereignty, the importance of knowledge 
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economy, the idea of dedicating 1% of the GNP of Egypt to scientific research, as well as 
adding the importance of working with the Egyptians living abroad for the scientific 
research cause.  
 
The clause within the current constitution that was put forward by ECASTI read 
as follows: Article 23 of the 2014 constitution: 
“The State shall ensure freedom of scientific research and encourage scientific 
research institutions as a mean to achieve national sovereignty and build a knowledge 
economy. The State shall sponsor researchers and inventors and allocate a percentage of 
government spending to scientific research equivalent to at least 1% of the Gross National 
Product (GNP), which shall gradually increase to comply with international standards. 
The State shall ensure effective means of contribution by private and non-governmental 
sectors and the participation of Egyptian expatriates in the progress of scientific 
research.”  (Egyptian Constitution, 2014) 
 
These were not the only clauses they actually lobbied for, as mentioned by the 
staff, there were clauses relating to the education system they were not able to pass. 
ECASTI idea was to make the education for free for the primary phase only, yet the 
following educational stages would be free for the talented, gifted, high achievers. This is 
because they see the system of education currently used in Egypt is a burden on the 
economy and it affects the quality of the education system.  
 
A second example is a comparative study between the different scientific research 
laws existing within different countries all over the world ECASTI worked on. Based on 
this comparative study, they developed the different pillars on which the law in Egypt 
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could be drafted. As a final step ECASTI proposed this draft in 2016 to the Ministry of 
Scientific research, however, by the time it was proposed, the Ministry itself had their 
proposal.  
 
The last example here is working on a strategy for scientific research and 
technology and innovation in Egypt. This strategy was part of the efforts done by the 
former Minister of Scientific research Dr. Sherief Hammad, who formed a small group in 
the form of a committee to review the structure of the different governmental 
organizations working on scientific research, technology, and innovation in Egypt. In 
other words to clear divides between the different governmental organizations working 
within this field, most importantly, the Ministry of Scientific Research (MoSR), the 
Academy for Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT), and the Science and 
Technology Fund in Egypt (STDF). The output of the work of this committee was mainly 
the scientific research, technology and innovation strategy for MoSR. Here the staff 
stressed on the idea that they were the only representative of the Civil Society present 
within the committee. Working on this strategy was problematic. ECASTI were the only 
representative of the civil society and they were taking the lead in the research for the 
strategies within different countries with similar context to the Egyptian one. ECASTI 
shared their work internally with their own Scientific Council, to take their input and 
feedback into consideration. The challenge here was that the document was shared by on 
the members of the council publicly. This incident reached the Prime Minister at the time, 
which then reached the Minister of Scientific research, which considered as a challenge 
and stopped the cooperation with ECASTI. Some major measures were taken by the 
Minister, most importantly banning ECASTI staff from entering the Ministry. Yet, as 
soon as their was a change in the cabinet, the Minister of Scientific Research also 
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changed, and when the strategy came out from the Ministry, the role of ECASTI was 
mentioned, which is considered as a formal recognition of the role of the NGO. Though 
the relations with the Ministry are not as strong as they were before, the relations are not 
completely cut, the ban from entering the Ministry ended.  
 
The staff members traced back the success in influencing the policy level to 
several reasons. First, Depending on the already existing network and connections. This 
was evident in the influence on the constitution, which can be traced back to the personal 
connections ECASTI had with the committer of 50 who drafted the current constitution. 
These personal connections allowed the organization to lobby on a solid base of trust.  
 
Second, a very important reason is the impact of international actors. A very 
evident example on this is the clause ECASTI managed to include in the constitution was 
a clause derived from the innovation strategy of the MoSR developed within the 
framework of the Partnership with the European Union (EU) in 2006. Also, the idea of 
establishing an organization like ECASTI came to existence because of a similar structure 
existing within the white house, advocating the policies of scientific research. The Chief 
Knowledge Officer within Misr Elkhier NGO was inspired by this role, and since Misr 
Elkhier is more focused on charity and development the idea was establish ECASTI as a 
spin off Misr Elkhier to assume the advocacy role within the scientific research field. 
Funding is another influence by the international actors, the availability of the funding 
opportunities influence greatly the type of activities the organization implements. The 
pool of funding defines the objectives and leaves smaller room for the organizations for 
maneuvering and working directly on their strategic objectives. Being worried about their 
survival sometime drifts away the attention of the organization from its mission. Also, 
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collaboration can be incited by international organizations as well. In the case of ECASTI 
one can draw on their project regarding the social innovation clusters, this project is 
funded by the EU, and within the call for applications a condition was to apply as a 
consortium, which led ECASTI to partner with several local NGOs such as AYB, Nahdet 
Al Mahroussa, and GESR of Misr El khier, as well as international organizations such as 
ASHOKA as well as the state represented in the RDI.  
 
The influence could also be disrupted by several factors, the staff summarized 
these factors as: First, “Policy change is a matter that involves the high level employees 
within the ministries and governmental organizations. Accordingly, it is sometimes 
affected by bottom down decisions. Influence could only be traced if it was backed up by 
the key stakeholders within the government, and with one decision the influence on the 
smaller level could be cancelled.” (Anonymous, 27 June 2016) 
 
 Second, The creation of parallel governmental structures to the civil society ones 
that would seem as an alternative to cooperating with the civil society. In the case of 
innovation, the creation of The Egyptian Science, Technology and Innovation 
Observatory (ESTIO) which was established in February 2014, only a few months after 
the establishment of ECASTI in October 2013. ESTIO is affiliated to the Academy of 
Scientific Research and Technology, the Ministry of Scientific Research. ESTIO and 
ECASTI are not cooperating together in any of their activities.  
 
In conclusion to this case, cooperation, recognition, support and thus influence on 
the policy level is a highly personalized manner; meaning that it depends highly on the 
Minister as a person and whether s/he is open for change or not rather than on the staff of 
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the ministry or the strategy guiding the ministry. Influence on the policy level is 
important to see tangible changes within the state. International actors influence the 
survival of civil society in terms of funding as well as on the content level. 
 
What this chapter offered is, first, an account of the current stance of social and 
economic development within innovation, second, understanding the influence of 
different factors on the field, third, identifying some changes within state practices in 
recognition, support, policy.  
 
In conclusion, after reviewing the field as a whole and going in depth with the two 
case studies, the role of the state is very evident within this field. The different state 
entities, though not acting in unison, are proactive and reach out to the civil society to 
work on the concept and create common understanding of how to move forward. Their 
power, for the time being, is also shared with other actors from civil society, private 
sector, and international actors. Creating a network of economic relations that is 
complicated a balance is present in it between the state as the political power and the rest. 
Until this moment, there is no involvement of military or ideological power within this 
network, which is contributing, to its survival.  Along the different political changes and 
turmoil taking place, this field has been growing exponentially independent from the 
political context. Yet, the political context had a great influence on the field on two 
levels; the first is the interest of youth in the field after the uprising in 2011, the second is 
any change within the policy level is always subject to the political will of the state and is 
not left to the day to day staff, which is considered as a challenge in personalizing the 
matter in the hands of different ministers one after the other without consistency in 
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strategy. International actors are one of the different stakeholders driving this network of 
relations and not the only driving force.  
 
After exploring the innovation field the next chapter would be exploring the civic 




Civic Education in Egypt 
Civic Education is not a newly emerging field; it has been integrated within the education 
system formally and informally since Nasser and even before this period. This field, 
unlike the innovation field, had educational, social and political purposes. This Chapter 
would follow the same structure of the innovation chapter in understanding the concept, 
mapping different stakeholders in Egypt, reflecting on the sustainability of the field, and 
finally ending with a case study. This structure is to analyze the social and economic 
development taking place in this field, as well as trying to explore the influence of 
political change, international actors, and the purpose of local civil society actors. As well 
as reflecting on the influence of civil society on state practices.  
 
In this chapter I would be outlining my experience in working within the field, 
both formally and informally. Formerly, I worked from 7 years in a local NGO called the 
Egyptian Youth Federation (EYF), I was heading the civic education program there, 
responsible for the partnership with the Ministry of Youth and sports (MoY), and finally 
responsible for the strategic planning of the NGO. On another level, I also worked within 
this field in developing different training manuals with different international 
organizations, and I was part of different regional and international networks working on 
Civic Education, most importantly the “Networking for European Citizenship Education” 
(NECE) since 2012.  And finally my experience in working on a research project 
mapping citizenship education in Egypt by the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute 




Understanding Civic Education in Egypt 
Throughout working within the field of Civic education for the past 9 years, I observed 
that both the terms Citizenship education and Civic education are used interchangeably. 
Not only Civic and Citizenship education, sometimes it is called “political” education, as 
in the German case. Yet, within the Egyptian context, both governmental as well as non-
governmental actors refer to both, civic education and citizenship education, as 
synonyms. Below are some important findings regarding how Civic education or 
Citizenship education (CE) is defined and their historical development within the 
Egyptian context. 
 
First, how CE was defined within the education system: CE can be traced back to 
1922 after Egypt’s independence. In this era courses in civics education were developed 
with the purpose to promote Egyptian nationalism, highlighting that Egypt remained an 
independent state, and paying little attention to the colonial history but rather focusing on 
how Egypt survived it as an independent entity  (El-Nagar & Krugly-Smolska, 2009).  
 
After Nasser came to power, the priority was to increase educational institutions’ 
capacities to accommodate more students; this came at the expense of improving 
curricula and led to “an environment that discouraged students’ participation, questioning 
and independent thought” (Baraka, 2008, pp. 6-7). CE was then included in social studies, 
Arabic language and religion, and not as a stand-alone subject (Baraka, 2008). 
Furthermore, the history textbooks focused on Arab nationality and students studied the 
history of all Arab nations (El-Nagar & Krugly-Smolska, 2009). After the war in 1973, 
the values of peace and dialogue were stressed, highlighting the role that dialogue played 
in accomplishing Camp David Peace Agreement (Baraka, 2008).  
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During Mubarak’s era, history and geography were renamed to social studies and 
included more information on civics including human rights and the meaning of 
democracy (Baraka, 2008). With the new millennium, more attention was directed at CE 
to be utilized to confront growing threats of extremism and globalization (Baraka, 2008,). 
Another supporting factor to CE’s growing prominence was pressure from international 
donor agencies on Egypt that required “quality learning that included interactive and 
democratic teaching styles” (Baraka, 2008, p. 6).  
 
During the period that followed the 2011 uprising, political changes were 
increasing; the regimes changed one after the other in a short period of time. “This led to 
three different curriculums from 2011 to 2014; one was issued for the academic year 
2011/2012 under the ruling of the Supreme Council of the Army Forces (SCAF), the 
second was issued for academic year 2012/2013 under the ruling of former president 
Mohammad Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood Group and the first civilian 
president for Egypt, the third was issued for academic year 2013/2014 under the ruling of 
interim president Adly Mansour, who came into power for a transitional period after the 
events of June 30th, 2013 “. (Ali et al., 2015: 11).    
 
Second, CE as defined outside the education system. This mainly exploring what 
CE meant for different CSOs. “CSOs in Egypt work now within the framework of 
developing: “well rounded, responsible citizens who know their legal rights and duties, 
and apply this knowledge to evaluate government policies and practices. Moreover, 
nurturing students to become citizens who work for the common good has a positive 
impact on their communities and societies” (Faour & Muasher, 2011, p. 12). Some CSOs 
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focused their programs on some concepts they define as important for CE, mainly: 
“citizenship, democracy, human rights, tolerance, and political participation” (Corbel & 
Pollock, 2012, p. 13). “ (Aly et al, 2015: 3) 
The understanding of CE used by CSOs conveys the political purpose behind 
working within the field for them. And thus has been affected greatly by the political 
changes within Egypt, and to what extent the state is widening or shrinking its control and 
power.  
 
Mapping of different stakeholders within Civic Education 
In the Egyptian context, there are two ministries that are mainly concerned with civic 
education, the Ministry of Education (MoE) that is mainly concerned with the schooling 
system and the Ministry of Youth (MoY) specifically under the Civic Education unit. In 
2005 a unit for CE was established within the MoY in partnership with UNICEF, which 
focuses mainly on CE projects. Since then, this CE unit has developed several 
partnerships with other International agencies to implement different programs in 
different parts of the country.  
 
As for civil society, CSOs have operated carefully within the field of CE, 
especially during Mubarak’s era, where organizations working on issues related to human 
rights and citizenship were not supported (Youniss & Barber et al., 2013).   
 
“According to the “Citizens in the Making” report conducted by Gerhart Center 
2012, only 14% of the civic education programs carried out by the NGOs do not target 
youth, while the rest focuses on youth solely. This trend can be explained by the focus of 
the Ministry of Youth (MoY) on CE for youth as well as the rising wave of youth 
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activism from 2011. Most programs carried out by the CSOs are centralized in the capital 
and big cities; Cairo, Alexandria and Minya, and the rest are neglected especially in 
Upper Egypt, Sinai and the Red Sea provinces (Corbel & Pollock, 2012). CSOs working 
in the field of Civic Education and Engagement are mainly International Donors and 
Agencies, Research Centers, Social Enterprises and registered and non-registered Youth 
Organizations and Student Activities.  
 
Along with the public sector and civil society organizations, there are other 
important and contributing stakeholders for the spread of civic education values and 
content; such as the media, political parties, private sector, and religious institutions as 
well as donors. Media is considered “powerful because it is widely accessible to all 
irrespective of their level of education and sophistication” (El-Mikawy, 2013, p. 33). “ 
(Ali et al, 2015: 5) 
 
Sustainability of Civic Education 
Unlike the innovation field, this field is greatly affected by the state. Since it has, as 
outlined above, political purpose and value the political changes on the state level 
affected the field greatly, in terms of what is allowed to be taught and who is allowed to 
be responsible for it. The intervention of the political power then together with the 
military and ideological powers sometimes hindered a network of power relations to 
emerge within this field. Instead, no particular patterns were developed, yet only random 






The Egyptian Youth Federation (EYF) 
In exploring this case, I mainly depend on primary sources because of the lack of 
published material on EYF. The primary sources I depend on are mainly: in depth 
interview with a staff member on 26th of August 2016, my personal experience as the 
director of programs of EYF for 7 years, annual reports and strategic plans of EYF, and 
finally, my personal experience in working closely with MoY on different projects.  
 
The Egyptian Youth Federation is a non-governmental umbrella organization for 
youth led and youth serving NGOs. Currently EYF has 17 members from different 
governorates, namely Cairo, Giza, Alexandria, Minya, North Sinai, and Damietta. Since 
its establishment, EYF has been aiming at empowering youth organizations so they can 
empower youth better serve and engage with their communities. This happens through 
networking as well as capacity development programs.  
 
EYF has been registered within the Ministry of Social Solidarity for the year 
2006. As stated in the law, EYF is the only Youth Federation that can exist in Egypt.   
The purpose of EYF is mainly to: develop the Capacity of its member 
organizations as a stepping-stone towards accomplishing their youth targeted objectives.  
The above-mentioned purpose was developed into three objectives: 
1. Strengthening the effectiveness of EYF as an umbrella organization 
representing the Egyptian Youth organizations.  
2. Creating a suitable environment for supporting youth work.  
3. Developing the capacity of Youth organizations.  
EYF started working within CE since its establishment in 2006 through different 
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programs. The approach towards CE evolved further after the uprising in January 2011. 
This was stemming from the interest of young people in community activism as well as 
the interest of the international organizations to work further with the Egyptian youth 
after the images from the demonstrations in Tahrir Square were shared.  
Since EYF is an umbrella organization, it derives its strength from the strength of 
its member organizations. It also designs its strategy from the strategies of it member 
organizations, and during the phase from 2011 and 2013 there was a rising trend within 
the member organizations to work with CE of youth. Consequently, EYF adopted that 
trend, during this period, the network with the governmental and the non-governmental 
sectors widened. EYF was keen on establishing links with the ministries involved within 
this field. Below is a more thorough explanation of this period. 
 
The influence of the 2011 uprising on EYF could be traced in three dimensions. 
The first is in the rise in the collaborative spirit of its member organizations. The second 
is mainly on the programming level. The third is regarding its relation to the different 
governmental organizations.  
 
Regarding the rise of the collaborative spirit of its member organizations; EYF 
suffered from a period of stagnation right before the uprising in 2011. During this 
stagnation period, the member organizations were losing interest in the different activities 
conducted by the organization. It was difficult to mobilize the member organizations and 
more difficult to mobilize the non-members to join. The member organizations were 10, 
and a maximum of 3 organizations were active. As 2011 uprising started, the 
collaborative spirit was on the rise. The different member organizations were coming 
back together to figure out how can they best use this already established umbrella 
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organization. Several meetings started taking place in the second half of 2011 to bring 
back the role of EYF as an advocacy network for youth issues, and mainly the civic 
education and engagement of youth. The member organizations agreed to give the lead 
back to NM and mobilize the different youth organizations. This happened through 
several awareness sessions held as well as field visits to different governorates such as 
Alexandria, North Sinai, Damietta, and Ismailia.  
 
Regarding the influence on the programming level; EYF started paying attention 
to its role as an advocacy network catering for the needs of the youth in Egypt. This was 
manifested in the different attempts of EYF to integrate participatory approaches in 
developing a Youth Policy. A participatory Youth Policy came as a priority of both the 
board of directors as well as the staff of EYF during 2011; this was mainly derived from 
the fact that the previous 2005 youth policy was not participatory. Dr. Safy El Din 
Kharboush, the chairperson of the National Council for Youth, introduced the draft 
national youth policy of 2005. And even this non-participatory national youth policy was 
not activated. EYF tried to integrate the youth policy component within all the projects it 
was implementing since the second half of 2011 and until 2016. Where in 2011, in 
cooperation with the UNICEF, EYF was able to conduct a 2 days event in cooperation 
with the Ministry of Youth gathering 30 youth from different governorates using 
participatory and engaging methods to get their inputs around how a youth policy should 
look like. In addition to partnering with the Swedish Youth Council in 2013 in a three-
year project with the main aim of developing a participatory National Youth Policy built 
on the successful examples from the Arab world, mainly the Lebanese example.  
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Lastly, the relations of EYF with the governmental organizations were influenced 
greatly by the changes that took place within the government after the uprisings in 2011. 
Two examples could be mentioned here, one is regarding MoY, known before as the 
National Council for Youth. EYF engaged in a lengthy trust building process with the 
National Council for Youth since the appointment of one of the prominent Civil Society 
figure as the vise chairperson. Since the vice-chairperson was from the same network as 
the chairperson of EYF, EYF chairperson and staff were invited for consultation several 
times within MoY. These visits to the ministry for meetings with different staff members 
from different departments led to widening the network of EYF within the ministry and 
thus building trust with the staff of the ministry that lasted even after the vice president 
left his post. EYF, though unsuccessful in influencing the development of a participatory 
youth policy, kept close relations with MoY and implemented several activities with the 
ministry from 2012 and until 2016. These activities were mainly revolving around 
integrating Dialogue within the different ministry activities with youth. The main success 
was the establishment of a partnership agreement with the CE unit within the Ministry, 
this partnership was mainly built on both EYF and MoY contributing to integrate new 
and innovative methods to civic education, developing the capacities of the facilitators 
working with the civic education unit of the ministry, and finally working directly in 
engaging the young people within the different venues owned by the ministry in dialogue 
with the administration.  
How this partnership developed and the influence it had can be summarized in the 
following points, as mentioned by one of EYF staff members in her/his interview with 
me: 
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1. The lengthy trust building process with the staff of the ministry starts with 
having a good network within the ministry.  A personal contact represented here in the 
vice-chairperson of the national youth council in 2012 was the gateway to the partnership. 
2. The trust building process is essential and lengthy. It involves the 
exchange of different documents, attending several meetings, in addition to working 
closely with the staff of the ministry.  
3. The level to which this trust is granted to the NGO was highly dependent 
on the personal connections the staff of EYF had with international organizations that 
were funding the ministry. In this case it was UNICEF, where as an organization it has 
been in partnership with the ministry for a long time. In addition, UNICEF was the main 
organization supporting the establishment of the Civic education unit within the ministry. 
Supporting the civic education unit was not only financial support; it was also technical 
support developing the capacity of the staff working within the unit. This somehow made 
the unit having a unique position within the ministry.   
The outcome of this partnership could be summarized in the following: 
1. Both EYF and the Civic Education unit were approached by another 
international organization to build on the existing partnership to start the implementation 
of a new project within Youth centers within the marginalized and poor areas in Egypt. 
With the main purpose of opening new spaces for civic education and political 
participation. This project was implemented in two phases reaching out to more than 20 
youth centers and generating more than 30 community based initiatives organized by the 
youth within the centers. These initiatives were then taken by the youth the youth centers 
administration as well as the governmental staff working on the municipal level to 
exchange ideas on how to implement the initiatives together. 
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2. Training of the facilitators of the civic education unit within the ministry 
by specialized trainers from the field of civic education present within the network of 
youth organizations of EYF.  
3. Different training manuals that were used by the civic education unit of the 
ministry after the partnership with EYF ended.  
4. Observed change in how the meetings between the ministry staff and EYF 
staff, were more equality was established. In addition, the meetings were done in a more 
participatory manner.  
5. Technical support of the ministry to EYF was offered, where a mutual 
agreement of EYF providing the content and the ministry providing all the logistical 
support for the different workshops conducted.  
6. The MoY taking the lead in developing different dialogue projects. One of 
which was launched in 2016 as a national dialogue platform implemented in the majority 
of the Youth Centers around Egypt.  
 
However this period of intensive cooperation that lasted for almost two years, 
leaving a long-term impact on both EYF and MoY, ended. The different causes I 
observed for the gradual withdrawal of MoY from the partnership could be summarized 
in: 
1. Starting from 2013 and Following the presidential elections of Al Sisy in 
2014, there has been a period where the different Ministries were freezing any 
agreements they have with international as well as national organizations. This affected 
the pool of funds both EYF and MoY were dependent on for implementation of their joint 
activities. Though some of MoY explicitly mentioned that they would like to proceed 
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with the activities, it was very difficult to get the approvals of the senior staff members 
within the ministry. 
2. CE has always been a sensitive issue, and with the rise of political and 
social unrest since 2013, the different ministries started exercising self-censorship until 
the political boundaries are set by the newly established political system. 
3. The Presidency announced 2016 as the year of youth, and thus started in 
developing the presidential leadership program that for some seemed like a parallel 
structure to what MoY has been doing for years. Though links with the Presidential 
Leadership Program were made, especially regarding the inclusive dialogue component 
the presidency expressed their will of implementing, the approval of the presidency was 
never granted, and thus EYF was not able to work with the youth within the leadership 
program.  
 
Though EYF was not able to influence the process of policy change regarding the 
participatory youth policy. Small and slow progress took place before the whole process 
was interrupted because it was not a priority within the Ministry of Youth’s strategy. 
 
Though some success could be traced in the partnership with the ministry of 
youth. EYF failed to establish any type of partnership with the Ministry of Education, 
where several meetings were conducted but they did not contribute to build the trust 
needed to establish the partnership and thus it failed before it started. On another level, a 
partnership that started yet did not evolve in a full-fledged partnership was with the 
Addiction Treatment and Abuse Fund. This partnership started with minor activities and 
both organizations were not able to scale it up, because neither organizations were able to 
put the resources that could contribute to the success of the up scaling process.  
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Influence of international organizations on EYF: 
The influence of the international organizations on EYF is evident in the different 
phases the organization went through. The idea of actually founding the organization 
came in 2004 in an event organized by Goethe institute Cairo bringing together different 
Civil Society organizations working within the field of development. 10 organizations 
from different governorate, namely Cairo, Minya, North Sinai, and Alexandria, came 
together, under the leadership of Nahdet Al Mahrousa8, to realize the importance of 
collaborative work and coming together to advocate for youth issues within the 
development field.  
 
Another influence would be the number of projects EYF was implementing that 
were mainly funded by the different international organizations. That in itself might not 
be regarded as international influence, yet the fact that EYF, mainly during the first few 
years of its establishment was responding to the calls for proposals by the international 
donors. These calls for proposals were very specific in terms of the field as well as in 
terms of the objectives of the call. This was the case with UNICEF, Konrad Adenuer 
Stiftung, and GIZ.  
 
Where with UNICEF, the project was mainly aimed at influencing the NGOs 
working with youth in order to develop their capacities to integrate adolescents within the 
board of directors of the different NGOs. This project was mainly influenced by the 
UNICEF strategy, simply because working with adolescents was not part of the target 
group of EYF before this project, and through this project EYF integrated this age bracket 
to the target group. The project succeeded in building the capacity of EYF on so many 
                                                
8 An NGO working on social innovation and entrepreneurship since 2004.  
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levels. Most importantly, developing a strategic plan for the organization, widen its 
network of different NGOs through awareness sessions and field visits to different 
governorates. The main challenge the project faced was drifting away from its main aim 
of integrating adolescents within the boards of the different NGOs, simply because the 
NGOs were reluctant to do so because they target an older age bracket and the NGO law 
does not allow adolescents to be within the board of directors of the NGOs, it specifically 
sets 21 as the legal age of being a member of the board of directors of any NGO.  
 
Regarding the German organizations from the GIZ and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 
this happened through an integrated German expert within EYF. This expert was part of 
the CIM program; this program mainly aims at placing experts within the developing 
countries in different organizations. “The Centre for International Migration and 
Development (CIM) is jointly run by GIZ and the International Placement Services 
(ZAV) of the German Federal Employment Agency.” (CIM, 2016). This integrated expert 
influenced the types of programs as well as the management of the organization greatly. 
When it comes to the type of programs, he was mainly on contact with the German 
organizations operating in Egypt. Since he joined EYF in 2010, the organization 
implemented different projects with GIZ (from the employment unit to the women’s 
rights unit), implemented different events with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung before it was 
shut down in Egypt, and applied with it to a major project in the European Commission in 
2011. In terms of management, the integrated expert managed to raise the capacity of the 
staff working within the organization by providing them with technical support, as well as 




EYF was more reactionary within applying for the different projects; another 
example on this would be the Ambassadors for Dialogue project funded with the Danish 
Youth Council. Where the Danish Youth Council was the one reaching out to EYF to 
partner in a project that works on bridging the gap between the Danish Youth and the 
Youth from different Arab countries.  
 
A final example that can be referred to here, is the membership of EYF within a 
Network for Arab and European Civic Education (NACE). This network was established 
due to the increased interest of the different European organizations working within the 
field, which gather together every year in conference called “Networking for European 
Citizenship Education” (NECE), in the Arab Spring. This interest led inviting different 
stakeholders from the Arab Spring countries to the NECE Conference in Cordoba, 
December 2012. From that year on, a core group was established to exchange best 
practices across the Atlantic. The outcome of this group was a comparative analysis of 
CE across different European as well as Arab titled “Citizenship in the Making between 
Europe and North Africa”, through writing country profiles for CE9. This study led EYF 
and DEDI (both members of the core team) to expand it to the previously mentioned 
mapping of CE in Egypt. Another outcome that could be traced would be the current 
attempt to create the Network for Arab Civic Education (NACE), an advocacy network 
for the Arab Civic Education stakeholders. NACE is still within the founding phase, it is 
very difficult to predict where will it actually head, yet it is following the footsteps of 
NECE, and highly influenced by it.  
The case of EYF mainly stresses on how within this field the political power, the 
state, is the one controlling the field. And civil society in this sense is more reactionary to 
                                                
9 Can be found on the NECE website on: 
http://www.bpb.de/veranstaltungen/netzwerke/nece/205936/country-profiles 
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the political changes happening. International actors have more influence on both the 
state and civil society than local actors having on the state. A defined and clear political 
purpose is always a challenge working in a politically changing context such as the 
Egyptian one.  
 
In conclusion, through the dynamic interaction between the international, national, 
and local organizations within a field as sensitive as CE only led to fluctuating periods of 
increased cooperation, shaping and reshaping of the different policies of all the 
stakeholders. Political power, military power, and ideological powers are the ones 
dominating this field, with a major role for the state in controlling and coordinating the 
activities of powerful groups within civil society. This pattern was broken at different 
instances of political change, this was evident in 2011.  
Personal networks had a vital role to play within the civil society state relations. 
The knowledge, where does it lie and how is it transferred between the different actors 
also played a major role in determining the level of cooperation.  
International actors play a major role within this field, yet unlike the field of 
innovation, In CE International actors are operating within the scope identified to them by 
the state.  
In the following chapter, I will outline the final conclusions derived from the 





Within this study I was exploring the different factors that are enabling civil society to 
influence state practices in Egypt. In attempting to answer this question I put forward this 
argument: purpose of local civil society actors, Political change, and International support 
are the main factors enabling civil society to influence the state practices. This influence 
could be used as an indicator in studying the economic and social development in Egypt. 
I then divided this argument into three sub-hypotheses and attempted to measure them: 
1. The more economic the purpose of local civil society actors is, the more 
successful they are in influencing State Practices. 
2. The period that followed the uprising in 2011 witnessed more influence on 
the State Practices by the local civil society actors. 
3. The more consistent the agenda of the Local civil society actors with the 
international organizations operating within the country, the more successful they are in 
influencing state practices. 
 
The chapters were organized in a way to tackle the three different hypotheses 
against the influence of the local actors on state practices in terms of recognition, support, 
and policy change. While also reflecting on the social and economic development of 
Egypt within the fields of study. The theoretical approach used was mainly dependent on 
Mann and Migdal (as explained earlier). Below I will be tackling the findings under each 
sub-hypothesis, move to the final argument and evaluation the relevance of both the 
methodology and the theoretical framework, then list the different gaps in the analysis, 
and end with recommendations for future research.  
First, the three sub-hypotheses: 
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1. The more economic the purpose of local civil society actors is, the more 
successful they are in influencing State Practices. 
 
Generally, the more political the purpose of civil society actors whether 
international or local the more difficult it is for them to cooperate with the state and not 
only to influence them. This could be found in the different historical phases from Nasser 
to Al Sisy, thus the more economic the purpose of the different civil society actors the 
more space they are allowed to interact with the state and thus means more possibility in 
influencing state practices. This is not an indicator of how strong the state is; it is an 
indicator of the intention of the state to widen its scope of control, whether is it successful 
or not is another issue to tackle. The legislative restrictions discussed in chapter 3 are 
evidence to this. In addition to the recently passed restrictive law from the Parliament in 
December 2016, shrinking the space allowed for civil society to operate.  
 
How far the purpose affects the influence on state practices is tracked within the 
different case studies. Evidence from the case studies suggest that, within the innovation 
field a stronger and possibly sustainable network is created between the different 
stakeholder including the state organizations allowing civil society to influence state 
practices and be recognized as critical mass advocating for change on the policy level, 
which might accepted or not. This critical mass operating within the space of civil society 
is also supported technically and financially by different state entities. This is unlike the 
case with CE, where the state exercises its political power over CSOs and from now to 
then shrinks their scope of influence.  
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2. The period that followed the uprising in 2011 witnessed more influence on 
the State Practices by the local civil society actors. 
Moments of political change, generally, offer space for civil society actors to 
influence the state. This was evident within the comparison of the historical context. 
Where the first few years of any change in the regime from Nasser till Al Sisy, always the 
years where influence on the recognition and support levels is very high, yet the state 
remains reluctant to being influenced on the policy level during this phase. Accordingly, 
2011 was no exception.  
By looking at the two fields, innovation and CE, the different case studies 
highlighted that 2011 brought changes to the society itself where new forms of organizing 
started to spread and were recognized by the state. In addition, the inability of the state to 
catch up with the changes happening within the civil society, and thus giving space for 
more flow of information and manpower from the civil society to the state institutions. 
This flow of personnel to state institutions during this period, created a network between 
civil society and state. This network existing to date, changed if not on the policy level as 
in the innovation field, impacts the day-to-day communication between the state and civil 
society.  
 
3. The more consistent the agenda of the Local civil society actors with the 
international organizations operating within the country, the more successful they are in 
influencing state practices. 
In general, social and economic development in Egypt has been affected greatly 
by international factors. Here I mean, not only the role of international organizations, but 
also international events. From the colonial history, to aid, to the different wars taking 
place in the region, from the different wars Egypt participated in. The historical chapter 
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could only capture the part of it relating to the impact of aid, and at certain cases the 
impact of international pressure.  
However, this hypothesis was mainly tested in the two fields of innovation and 
CE. Where the role of the international actors took different forms from supporting in 
enlarging the space of the civil society, to supporting in ecosystem within which civil 
society is operating (evident in the innovation case). And also supporting the state itself 
within the two fields, in this sense International actors sometime are holding the role of 
the mediator between the civil society and the state as the case was in the trust building 
process between CSOs and state entities in the field of CE. The more consistent the local 
civil society actors were with the international organizations the more likely they are able 
to influence the state practices, unless they have political purposes and then the political 
power of the state would prevail.  
 
Though the different sub-hypotheses were tested, there are some limitations of the 
study that must be mentioned. The first is the limited ability of the to use the findings as a 
concrete indicator to the social and economic development of Egypt at this point. This is 
due to the complexity inherent in the development context in Egypt nowadays. This 
complexity and fast changes within the political sphere contribute to the first set of 
challenges in reaching a generalization. Another limitation relates to theoretical 
framework, as much the approaches used give a solid framework to look through, this 
framework is very wide, trying to take all the different factors that contribute to the 
historical narrative of the state to be taken into consideration, also criticizing the different 
generalizations reached by other scholars. This wide scope of analysis makes it very 
difficult sometimes to gather all the meaningful data and analyze them thoroughly. In 
addition, the study requires more time, fieldwork, and case studies so that one can reach a 
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definitive indicator. In short, the relevance of the theoretical framework is also its main 
challenge. Another limitation relates to the fieldwork and the data collection within this 
time in Egypt. Where working with such a sensitive topic such as state society relations 
did not make it easy for me to get approval from the different stakeholders to conduct 
interviews with them, especially the ones in the government. Confidentiality had to be 
guaranteed, and accordingly some of the gathered information could not be shared and 
thus used within the framework of analysis.  
 
Moving on from the limitations and the gaps to the recommendations to future 
research. The first recommendation would be widening the timeframe so that the 
historical narrative could be more elaborative and is not disrupted. Including more case 
studies from different fields would either strengthen the observed patterns or point them 
out as coincidence and highlights other patterns to be examined. Include the how the 
different factors relate to each other and how they also relate to other factors that are not 
mentioned. Including different methodologies such as network analysis of the people 
working within the different fields, to convey the relations that exist and how they 
influence the state practices, this network analysis should take into consideration the 
different propositions and jobs individuals within the network acquired over a selected 
time period to be able to track down the different relations existing within the networks 
and how the influence is created. Also a comparative analysis between Egypt and other 




Annex 1: Questionnaires 
Annex (1. A) Development Questionnaire: 




2. If yes, what type of organization: 
NGO/ Association 
Initiative 
CSR of a Company 
Another 
3. How do you define Development?  
4. In your work do you think that the development agenda is dictated to you 
by the state? 
Yes  
No 
5. In your work do you think that the development agenda is dictated to you 
by the Donor Organization? 
6. In your work you have the freedom to set your own agenda and strategies? 
Yes 
No 
7. DO you have any examples in which your work affected the development 
strategy of the state and/ or the donor? 
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Annex (1.b): Innovation Questionnaire: 
 
1. I work within the field of innovation:  
Yes. 
No.  
2. Age Bracket: 
Less than 18  
From 18 to 21 
From 22 to 25 
From 26 to 29  
From 30 to 34 
More than 34  





Lecturer/ Professor  
Employee.  
Investor.   
4. Sector:  
Gov.  
NGO.  
Not for Profit  un registered Initiative 
Start up 
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Other, For Profit Entity, Specify  
Other,  
 




Since 2009- 2010 
Since 2011- 2012 
After 2013- Now  
6.  Do you think Innovation is important for Development: 
Yes/ No 
Please justify your answer: 
7. Are entrepreneurs by default innovators? 
Yes 
No  
Please justify your answer 
8. How do you see the link between innovation and entrepreneurship? 
9.  How do you see the link between Innovation and Technology? 
10. How do you see the link between Innovation and Scientific Research? 
11. Which of the below mentioned Definitions is closest to your understanding of 
innovation: 
“The process of translating an idea or invention into a good or service that creates 
value or for which customers will pay.” Business Dictionary 
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“An innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved product 
(good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in 
business practices, workplace organization or external relations.” Based on “Oslo 
Manual”, 3. rd. edition, 2005 
Other, please mention the one you may use the most.  
12. What type of value does a program/project/initiative have to hold to be 
considered innovative? 








13. What Economic value does Innovation hold, If any: 
14. What Social value does Innovation hold, If any: 
15. What Political value does Innovation hold, If any: 
16. What Technological value does Innovation hold, If any: 
17. What Scientific value does Innovation hold, If any: 
18. What do you know about open innovation? 
19. Which of these Projects/programs/organizations/ Initiative/ Company would 
you consider Innovative: 
( you can choose more than 1) 
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YIA: https://www.facebook.com/yiaprogram/?fref=nf  
Eventtus: https://www.facebook.com/EventtusApp/?fref=ts  
RiseUp: https://www.facebook.com/riseupsummit/  
Alshanek Ya Balady AYB: 
https://www.facebook.com/AlashanekYaBaladyNGO/?fref=ts  
GESR: https://www.facebook.com/GESR.Egypt/?fref=ts  
Yomken. com https://www.facebook.com/Yomkencom/?fref=ts  
Egypt innovate: https://www.facebook.com/EgyptInnovate/  
Presidential leadership Program: https://www.facebook.com/plpegypt/  
Cairo Runners: https://www.facebook.com/CairoRunners/?fref=ts  
Morsi Meter: https://www.facebook.com/MorsiMeter/  
Ambassadors for Dialogue: https://www.facebook.com/ambassadorsfordialogue/  
Messaha, 
The district,  
Other, specify  
20. What is still needed to enhance the Innovation Ecosystem? 
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Annex 2: in-depth interviews questions: 
1.   Introduce yourself, your organization, and your role? 
2.   If addressed to civil Society: 
3.   If addressed to governmental official: Does your work involve working 
with the government? In what way? 
4.   For civil society actors: 
•    How would you define your role as civil society? 
•     What is the objective of your organization/ project? 
•    Does your work involve working with the government? in what way? 
•    How would you describe your relations with the government? 
•    From your experience: Have you seen any change in the behavior of the 
government towards civil society in the past few years? what sparked this change? 
•    From your experience: Have you see any change in the support of the 
government to the civil society during the past few years? what sparked this change? 
•    From your experience: have you seen any change in the governments’ 
policies within your field? what sparked this change? 
•    Would you consider your work/interaction with the government 
influencing it and/ or influenced by it in any way? how? 
1.  For governmental officials: 
•     Does your work involve working with the civil society? in what way? 
•    How would you describe your relations with the civil society? 
•    What do you think is the role of the civil society? what role are they 
playing now in Egypt? 
•    From your experience: Have you seen any change in the behaviour of the 
civil society towards the government in the past few years? what sparked this change? 
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•    Would you consider your work/interaction with the civil society 
influencing it and/ or influenced by it in any way? how? 
2.  For International Organizations: 
•    How would you define your role as civil society? 
•     What is the objective of your organization/ project? 
•    How do you see your role as a international organization within the local 
context in Egypt? 
•    How would you describe your relations with the local civil society actors? 
•    Does your work involve working with the government? in what way? 
•    How would you describe your relations with the government? 
•    From your experience: Have you seen any change in the behavior of the 
government towards civil society in the past few years? what sparked this change? 
•    From your experience: Have you see any change in the support of the 
government to the civil society during the past few years? what sparked this change? 
•    From your experience: have you seen any change in the governments’ 
policies within your field? what sparked this change? 
•    Would you consider your work/interaction with the government 
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